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“Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat the enemy means
taking the offensive.” —Sun Tzu, The Art of War [4:5]1
“Only the active defense is the real defense, and is the defense for the counter attack
and offense.” —Attributed to Mao Zedong2
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I. Introduction
Once primarily the domain of the federal government and a few specialized
defense contractors, “active defense” has become an increasingly common topic
even in unclassified circles due to (a) much more media exposure, (b) a general
relaxing of attitudes toward offensive cyber behavior and, to some extent, (c) a
frustration with the ability for companies to protect themselves with a purely
defensive posture. Whether called active defense, standing your cyber ground, or
hacking back, the notion of offensive use of cyber capability continues to gain
considerable attention. As we ponder the implications of publicly-reported
cyberattacks with a kinetic component (e.g., America’s alleged involvement in
Stuxnet3 and the appearance of Flame4), we also need to determine if other broad
attacks (e.g., Duqu5 and Shamoon6) should be viewed as significant steps forward in
attack vectors or simply more annoying distractions in the cyber landscape. In any
event, no one can deny that offensive operations must be considered as a possible
device in the cyber toolkit.7 The logic seems valid — the right of self-defense has
existed for hundreds of years in the physical realm; it should have a corresponding
construct in the cyber world. Unfortunately, a lack of clarity in current law and
policy has not allowed that to happen.
The U.S. military defines active defense as “[t]he employment of limited
offensive action and counterattacks to deny a contested area or position to the
enemy,”8 but the government more generally has had a difficult time defining
“active defense” in the civilian cyber realm.9 For a host of reasons, ethical and legal
issues associated with active defense have consistently served as barriers to having a

3. David E. Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2012, at
A1 (describing the Stuxnet worm as part of a secret U.S. government cyberattack program against Iran’s nuclear
enrichment efforts, code-named Olympic Games).
4. Nicole Perlroth, Researchers Find Clues in Malware, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2012, at B1 (describing Flame
as “a data-mining virus designed to steal information from computers across the Middle East,” and indicating
that it may have been developed by the authors of Stuxnet).
5. See Mathew J. Schwartz, 3 Lessons Learned from Duqu Malware, INFORMATIONWEEK (Oct. 20, 2011),
http://www.informationweek.com/security/cybercrime/3-lessons-learned-from-duqu-malware/231901299
(describing Duqu as a Trojan that “was designed to collect information for cyberespionage purposes”).
6. See Phil Stewart, “Shamoon” Virus Most Destructive Yet for Private Sector, Panetta Says, REUTERS, Oct.
12,
2012,
available
at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/12/us-usa-cyber-pentagon-shimoonidUSBRE89B04Y20121012 (describing the Shamoon virus as having infected, and rendered useless, over 30,000
computers at Saudi Arabia’s Armaco and Qatar’s RasGas in August 2012).
7. In fact, at least one expert has observed that “[w]e can prevail only if we mount near-perfect
defenses . . . . This . . . is, quite simply, too hard. A wholly passive strategy almost never works in the real world.”
STEWART A. BAKER, SKATING ON STILTS: WHY WE AREN’T STOPPING TOMORROW’S TERRORISM 228 (2010).
8. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., JOINT PUB. 1-02, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND
ASSOCIATED TERMS 2 (2012), available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf.
9. See Ellen Nakashima, When is a Cyberattack a Matter of Defense?, WASH. POST CHECKPOINT WASH.
(Feb. 27, 2012, 3:07 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/checkpoint-washington/post/active-defenseat-center-of-debate-on-cyberattacks/2012/02/27/gIQACFoKeR_blog.html (noting discord between the White
House and the Department of Defense as to the definition of the term).
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robust private sector dialog about the issue (though military analyses have been
conducted).10 For example, President Obama signed Presidential Policy Directive 20
in October 2012, which provides federal agencies with guidelines for conducting
cyber operations, however, this remains secret from the public despite how it
governs protection of private sector networks that support critical national
infrastructure.11
Several reports and commentators have referred to the use of “all the tools of
U.S. power”12 or confronting cyberattacks “with all available means”13 in discussing
the overall aspects of the government’s approach to cybersecurity. Many view these
types of phrases as indirect references to offensive use of cyber capabilities. Other
dialog related to military use of cyber capabilities has included more direct
references to “use of force,”14 “cyberattack[s],”15 and “act[s] of war.”16 Further
confusing the issue are discussions that conflate cyber espionage and cyberattacks.17
For the commercial and private sectors, regardless of the terms used, an attack on
their networks is just that, an attack that must be dealt with in some manner.
We have begun to see, however, certain progress being made toward gradually
(and appropriately) shifting our military policy to deal with current threats. In his
10. See COMM. ON OFFENSIVE INFO. WARFARE, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS.,
TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS REGARDING U.S. ACQUISITION AND USE OF CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES
x–xi, 28 (William A. Owens et al. eds., 2009) (describing how the recent emergence of cyberattack technologies
coupled with the secrecy of the U.S. government on the issue has prevented a full dialog on the subject from
occurring).
11. See Ellen Nakashima, Obama Issues Guidance on Cyberwarfare, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2012, at A07
(finding the PPD as the most sweeping effort by the White House to set forth “offensive” and “defensive”
standards for cyber activities).
12. The Commission on Cybersecurity for the 44th Presidency recommended the creation of “a
comprehensive national security strategy for cyberspace” that would include “all the tools of U.S. power—
international engagement and diplomacy, military planning and doctrine, economic policy tools, and the work
of the intelligence and law enforcement communities.” CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, SECURING
CYBERSPACE FOR THE 44TH PRESIDENCY 17 (2008) (emphasis added), available at http://csis.org/files/media/csis
/pubs/081208_securingcyberspace_44.pdf.
13. Specifically, Senator Joseph Lieberman said that “Google’s experience should be a lesson to us all to
confront this ever growing problem aggressively and with all available means.” Paul Eckert, U.S., Google and
China Square Off Over Internet, REUTERS, Jan. 13, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60
C1TR20100113 (emphasis added).
14. WHITE HOUSE, CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW 20 (2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
assets/documents/Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final.pdf (“The United States needs to develop a strategy [for
cybersecurity] designed to shape the international environment and bring like-minded nations together on a
host of issues, including acceptable [legal] norms regarding territorial jurisdiction, sovereign responsibility, and
use of force.”).
15. COMM. ON OFFENSIVE INFO. WARFARE, supra note 10, at 1.
16. Siobhan Gorman & Julian E. Barnes, Cyber Combat: Act of War — Pentagon Sets Stage for U.S. to
Respond to Computer Sabotage With Military Force, WALL ST. J., May 31, 2011, at A1.
17. Compare COMM. ON OFFENSIVE INFO. WARFARE, supra note 10, at 1, 261 (distinguishing cyber
espionage, defined as non-destructive “intelligence gathering activity” from cyberattacks, defined as “deliberate
actions to alter, disrupt, deceive, degrade, or destroy computer systems or networks or the information and/or
programs resident in or transiting these systems or networks”), with Gorman & Barnes, supra note 16
(providing an example of an incorrect reference to cyber break-ins and data theft as cyberattacks).
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remarks on Department of Defense (DoD) Cyber Strategy at the National Defense
University in July 2011, Deputy Secretary of Defense Bill Lynn focused on the
notion that “our posture in cyberspace must mirror the posture we assume to
provide security for our nation overall.”18 He went on to state that:
Rather than rely on the threat of retaliation alone to deter attacks in
cyberspace, we aim to change our adversaries’ incentives in a more
fundamental way. If an attack will not have its intended effect, those who
wish us harm will have less reason to target us through cyberspace in the
first place.19
His additional remarks focused on enhancing our cyber defenses, but numerous
other commentators have made it clear that offensive tactics must be a part of the
strategy.20
Lynn also talked about the Defense Industrial Base (DIB) and the importance of
the relationship between the government and private sector.21 The DIB Cyber Pilot
provided companies with enhanced and robust protection for their networks by
allowing classified threat intelligence to be shared “with defense contractors or their
commercial Internet service providers along with the know-how to employ it in
network defense. By furnishing this threat intelligence, we are able to help
strengthen these companies’ existing cyber defenses.”22
Analogizing between active defense and self-defense can be a useful analytical
starting point. While self-defense in one’s home clearly enjoys legal protection,23 no
such clarity exists in cyberspace. Despite this, many purported advantages of active
cyber defense exist, including the ability to respond promptly to an attack, control
over the situation by the victim, and no need for a victim to rely on or report the
incident to anyone else, such as law enforcement. There are disadvantages, though.
For example, the response from a victim against an attacker could lead to an

18. William J. Lynn, III, Deputy Sec’y of Def., Remarks on the Department of Defense Cyber Strategy (July
14, 2011), available at http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1593.
19. Id.
20. See id. (discussing why the military needs offensive cyber capabilities); see also, e.g., COMM. ON
OFFENSIVE INFO. WARFARE, supra note 10, at 69 (recommending that the United States maintain and acquire
effective offensive cyber capabilities).
21. Lynn, supra note 18.
22. Id. The Defense Industrial Base pilot has since had its mission widened to include all critical
infrastructure sectors and has been officially sanctioned as the Enhanced Cybersecurity Services program. Exec.
Order No. 13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739 (Feb. 12, 2013).
23. See, e.g., Crawford v. State, 190 A.2d 538, 541 (Md. 1963) (stating that “[t]here is also a generally
accepted rule, which we think is correct, that a man faced with the danger of an attack upon his dwelling need
not retreat from his home to escape the danger, but instead may stand his ground and, if necessary to repel the
attack, may kill the attacker”).
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escalation — a digital “arms race;”24 determining absolute attribution25 can be
difficult if not near impossible;26 the retaliatory or defensive strike may cause more
harm than the original attack and could easily impact innocent bystanders.27
Furthermore, legal uncertainties exist as to whether active defense as a form of selfdefense would be permitted.28
Those in favor of employing active defense are in general agreement about its
inherent dangers.29 On the fundamental issue of identifying the attacker, some
commentators point out that increasing the accuracy of attribution would actually
be detrimental as it would impinge on privacy rights.30 Such a premise, however, is
based on the overly restrictive assumption that “[r]etaliation requires knowing with
full certainty who the attackers are.”31 While that would be an ideal situation, the
reality differs significantly. Absolute technical attribution rarely can be achieved.32
The question becomes, then, what level of attribution would be appropriate from a
policy perspective in order to justify the use of active defense.
By far, attribution arises as the most significant issue around active defense.33 As
many commentators have somewhat erroneously noted, the Internet developed as
an open environment without security in mind.34 A somewhat more precise

24. See David E. Graham, Cyber Threats and the Law of War, 4 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 87, 97–98
(2010) (“[D]ecisions inherent in the use of active defense measures in response to a cyber attack are . . . fraught
with policy considerations and risks of conflict escalation . . . .”).
25. “Attribution” in this context refers to definitively and demonstrably identifying the attacker despite
any ruses employed. Attribution, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 80 (11th ed. 2007) (defining
attribution as “the ascribing of a work (as of literature or art) to a particular author or artist [or] . . . an ascribed
quality, character, or right”).
26. JEFFREY HUNKER ET AL., INSTITUTE FOR INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, ROLE AND CHALLENGES FOR
SUFFICIENT CYBER-ATTACK ATTRIBUTION 5 (2008).
27. COMM. ON OFFENSIVE INFO. WARFARE, supra note 10, at 210.
28. See Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Mitigative Counterstriking: Self-Defense and Deterrence in
Cyberspace, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 429, 521 (2012) [hereinafter Kesan & Hayes, Mitigative Counterstriking]
(noting that the common law claim of defense of property has never been invoked as a defense by a party being
sued or prosecuted for engaging in a mitigative counterstrike to a cyberattack).
29. See, e.g., id. at 486.
30. HUNKER, supra note 26, at 11–12, 16, 19; see also David D. Clark & Susan Landau, Untangling
Attribution, in PROCEEDINGS OF A WORKSHOP ON DETERRING CYBERATTACKS: INFORMING STRATEGIES AND
DEVELOPING OPTIONS FOR U.S. STRATEGY 25, 25 (2010), available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?
record_id=12997&page=25.
31. Clark & Landau, supra note 30, at 25.
32. See infra note 37 and accompanying text; David Hollis, USCYBERCOM: The Need for a Combat
Command versus a Subunified Command, JOINT FORCE Q., July 2010, at 48–53, available at http://www.ndu.edu/
press/lib/images/jfq-58/JFQ58_48-53_Hollis.pdf; Herbert Lin, Offensive Cyber Operations and the Use of Force, 4
J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 63, 77 (2010).
33. Cyber-warfare: Hype and Fear, ECONOMIST, Dec. 8, 2012, at 6263, available at
http://www.economist.com/news/international/21567886-america-leading-way-developing-doctrines-cyberwarfare-other-countries-may.
34. Thomas A. Longstaff et al., Security of the Internet, in 15 THE FROEHLICH/KENT ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 233 (Marcel Dekker ed., 1997) (“The ARPANET protocols . . . were originally designed
for openness and flexibility, not for security.”).
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statement would be: what has become the commercial Internet developed without
security in mind. Although originally developed out of a military/governmental
project, the transition to a commercial environment meant that some of the very
first attempts to add security clearly were not followed.35 Regardless, anonymity
occurred on the Internet more through evolution than as a result of ardent privacy
activists.36 As observed in a critique of a documentary about the early days of
computing:
The upcoming shift, from in [sic] invite-only world to what we have today,
is important; that’s when hackers realized they were no longer alone on the
Internet and had to go underground. Jeff Moss, founder of Black Hat and
DefCon, describes in one of his interview segments growing up in the Bay
Area in the 1980s and having one of the first affordable home computers
that, with a modem, connected over the phone to various bulletin boards.
He says that he could connect and no one would know his true identity or
age; he would only be judged by what he wrote. For a 14 year old boy, Moss
37
says it was liberating to be able to talk about sex and drugs.
Ultimately, we must contend with the fact that the current Internet is “flat,”
meaning the lack of ability to accurately identify people or devices can significantly
inhibit online trust.38 As such, even someone with no authority can at least “knock
on the door” of any network around the world within his or her reach. Until we get
to a point with better authentication (and, therefore, better ability to keep even
more sophisticated intruders out), the ability to use offensive cyber methods at least
to some level is needed. Such use necessarily depends on a clear national policy and
legal position that addresses active defense. Such a policy will require a workable
framework toward attribution (i.e., the identification of the attacker), including a
determination of the nature and scope of the attack, along with a risk assessment

35. PAUL BARAN, RAND CORP., MEM. RM-3765-PR, ON DISTRIBUTED COMMUNICATIONS: IX. SECURITY,
SECRECY, AND TAMPER-FREE CONSIDERATIONS iii–iv (1964), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand
/pubs/research_memoranda/2006/RM3765.pdf (“The present Memorandum . . . [considers] the security
aspects of a system of the type proposed, in which secrecy is of paramount importance” and evaluating the
premise that the existence of spies within the supposedly secure system must be anticipated. Security provisions
are based on the belief that protection is best obtained by “raising the ‘price’ of espied information to a level
which becomes excessive.” (emphasis added)).
36. See, e.g., Daniel B. Levin, Note, Building Social Norms on the Internet, 4 YALE SYMP. ON L. & TECH. 97,
119 (2002) (attributing anonymity on the Internet to architectural features of the “code of basic Internet
protocols, of Internet service providers, and of websites”).
37. Robert Vamosi, The Best Hacking Film You Haven’t Seen (Yet), FORBES (July 20, 2012, 1:19 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertvamosi/2012/07/20/the-best-hacking-film-you-havent-seen-yet/.
38. WHITE HOUSE, supra note 14, at 33 (“With the systems available today for most Internet transactions,
the electronic equivalent of cues people use to establish trust might be absent, incomplete, or difficult to
understand and act upon.”).
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considering the implications of mistakenly employing countermeasures (e.g.,
misattribution).
The nagging question involves picking the level of certainty required by a victim
of cyberattack in the identity of the attacker before responding. At one extreme
would be absolute knowledge of the identity of the attacker.39 However, several
scholars agree that significant difficulty exists in attaining 100% certainty of an
attacker’s identity and that even identifying an attacker beyond a reasonable doubt
is “bordering on impossible.”40At the other extreme would be a policy where little,
if any, diligence would be required prior to attacking back. Richard Clarke provides
perhaps the most accurate answer by stating that it will “depend upon the realworld circumstances at the time.”41 In this paper, we will lay out an argument that,
since absolute identification of a cyber attacker is unrealistic, a national dialog
should occur around what constitutes adequate attribution.42 We will then provide
a normative framework for use by the private sector when contemplating the use of
active cyber defense.43

II. Interested Stakeholders and Their Role in Cyber Offense
It is no secret that the U.S. government as well as many other governments around
the world have the ability to conduct offensive cyber operations.44 The U.S.
government’s offensive cyber resources are shared between the military and
intelligence communities.45 While the extent and capabilities of those offensive
assets are not public, it is reasonable to assume that they are substantial.46

39. See Clark & Landau, supra note 30, at 25 (“Retaliation requires knowing with full certainty who the
attackers are.” (emphasis omitted)).
40. Willie D. Jones, Declarations of Cyberwar: What the Revelations about the U.S.-Israeli Origin of Stuxnet
Mean for Warfare, IEEE SPECTRUM (Aug. 2012), http://spectrum.ieee.org/computing/networks/declarations-ofcyberwar (quoting Larry Constantine, a software developer and professor at the University of Madeira in
Portugal, as saying “it’s difficult, bordering on impossible, to identify a cyberattacker beyond a shadow of a
doubt”).
41. RICHARD A. CLARKE & ROBERT K. KNAKE, CYBERWAR: THE NEXT THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY AND
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 215 (2010).
42. See infra Part IV.
43. See infra Part V.A.
44. See, e.g., Ellen Nakashima, Pentagon: Cyber Offense Part of U.S. Strategy, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 2011
(“The Pentagon is prepared to launch cyberattacks in response to hostile actions . . . .”).
45. See William J. Lynn, III, Deputy Sec’y of Def., Remarks at Stratcom Cyber Symposium (May 26, 2010),
http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1477 (noting role of U.S. Cyber Command in offensive
cyber measures and calling the National Security Agency a “core” part of the U.S. government’s cyber efforts);
see also Cybersecurity: DHS’ Role, Federal Efforts, and National Policy: Hearing Before the H. Com. on Homeland
Security, 111th Cong. 36 (2010) (statement of Rep. Michael T. McCaul, Member, H. Comm. on Homeland
Security) (“We have NSA, DOD that are very good at the offensive capability . . . .”).
46. See David A. Fulghum, Darpa to Develop Offensive Cyber Weapons, 242 AEROSPACE DAILY & DEF. REP. 3
(2012), available at 2012 WLNR 13092082; David E. Sanger, U.S. Plans Attack and Defense in Web Warfare, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 28, 2009, at A1.
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Other portions of the federal government, e.g., the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ), have substantial investigative,
remediation and other resources, but are generally thought to lack much offensive
capability.47 Likewise, state and local governmental agencies are not believed to
possess offensive cyber resources.48
Further, while offensive capabilities are the exclusive province of the
government, active defense is not. Government contractors, private enterprise, and
even individuals are capable of and driven to implementing active defenses in an
effort to frustrate, dissuade, deter, and hold responsible cyber attackers.49
Defense contractors are, by virtue of their commercial success, proximity to the
government, and the value of the information they maintain, frequent targets of
cyber espionage.50 For many of the same reasons, these contractors are uniquely
situated to engage in more ‘active’ defensive measures against attackers.51 Their
close ties to the government and more granular intelligence (including more
accurate attribution) likely provide these contractors with a higher level of
confidence both as to the efficacy of defense used, and whether domestic authorities
are likely to tolerate their more active measures.
The rest of corporate America is not as fortunate as the defense industrial base
when it comes to accurate intelligence, cooperative government relationships, or
deployable cyber defenses. For most companies, active defense is a theoretical but
out of reach capability sought by the overworked CSO rather than a deployable
option (even without regard to the legalities). Still, some of the largest enterprises
have built security teams competent enough to understand and execute on
52
offensive measures against attackers. When vital corporate intellectual property or

47. COMM. ON OFFENSIVE INFO. WARFARE, supra note 10, at 137, 213 (discussing the investigative,
remedial, and defensive roles of DHS and DOJ in cyberspace).
48. See COMM. ON OFFENSIVE INFO. WARFARE, supra note 10, at 201, 201 n.2 (noting that state and local
law enforcement lack authority to, for example, carry out denial-of-service attacks against wireless networks to
prevent their use to conduct remote bombings).
49. See, e.g., Joseph Menn, Hacked Companies Fight Back With Controversial Steps, REUTERS, June 18, 2012,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/18/us-media-tech-summit-cyber-strikeback-idUSBRE85G0
7S20120618 (“Companies can also allow intruders to make off with bogus files or ‘beacons’ that reveal
information about the thieves’ own machines, experts say.”).
50. See, e.g., Siobhan Gorman et al., Computer Spies Breach Fighter-Jet Project, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 2009, at
A1 (detailing theft of sensitive information on the F-35 fighter jet from defense contractors Lockheed Martin
and BAE by attackers possibly located in China); David Leppard, Chinese Steal Jet Secrets from BAE, SUNDAY
TIMES (London) (Mar. 11, 2012), http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/uk_news/National/article9915
81.ece (indicating that British intelligence had confirmed to BAE that China was behind the data breach).
51. See David A. Fulgham, Boeing’s Buying Cyber, AVIATION WEEK LE BOURGET BLOG (June 11, 2009 3:29
PM), http://www.aviationweek.com/blogs.aspx?plckblogid=blog:dd3390dd-c9af-47ab-8bf5-3405dbe4a111&
plckpostid=blog:dd3390dd-c9af-47ab-8bf5-3405dbe4a111post:159ca117-4d83-411a-8943-272bc82f3306
(noting Boeing’s use of active defense technologies).
52. See Andy Greenberg, New Grad Looking For a Job?: Pentagon Contractors Post Openings For Black-Hat
Hackers, FORBES (June 15, 2012, 9:22 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2012/06/15/new-grad-
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multibillion dollar deals are on the line, the potential legal exposure arising out of
such actions is just another frustration.53

III. Hypothetical and Non-Attribution Private Sector Attack
Scenarios and Responses
A. Process
Today, a large number of cyberattacks in the commercial sector begin with an
initial compromise achieved through phishing.54 That is, attackers send an
employee at the intended victim company an email or other electronic
communication pretending to be a trusted entity.55 These phishing communications
sometimes solicit credentials directly, but more often include an attachment
consisting of — or a link to — a malware “payload.”56 This malware payload, once
executed, establishes a foothold in the corporate IT environment, escalates
privileges, moves laterally across systems, and works to maintain its presence.57 At
the same time, the attackers controlling the malware use it to search the corporate
networks and provide or plant information or code of their choosing.58
Preventing these types of attacks is difficult. If an adversary attempting to
penetrate a network is advanced, as is the case with state-sponsored attacks, they
will have access to technology and exploits that circumvent the traditional
“Maginot Line” layer of traditional network security.59 To detect these advanced
attackers, companies need services or devices with access to up-to-date intelligence
about the newest methods in use by advanced attackers.60 Even then, prevention of
looking-for-a-job-pentagon-contractors-post-openings-for-black-hat-hackers-2/ (describing how large defense
contractors are actively seeking job applicants with offensive cyber skills).
53. See Coca-Cola ‘Targeted’ by China in Hack Ahead of Acquisition Attempt, BBC (Nov. 5, 2012, 9:49 PM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-20204671.
54. Warwick Ashford, Phishing Attacks Cast Wider Nets in Businesses, COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM (Sept. 28,
2012, 2:29 PM), http://www.computerweekly.com/news/2240164139/Phishing-attacks-cast-wider-nets-inbusinesses.
55. See Saul Hansell, Online Swindlers, Called ‘Phishers,’ Lure the Unwary, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2004, at A1
(discussing phishing attacks and their mechanics).
56. Sudhir Aggarwal et al., Trust-Based Internet Accountability: Requirements and Legal Ramifications, 13 J.
INTERNET L. 3, 11 (2010).
57. See Uri Rivner, Anatomy of an Attack, SPEAKING OF SECURITY (Apr. 1, 2011), http://blogs.rsa.com/
rivner/anatomy-of-an-attack/ (describing the process of a recent successful phishing attack against
cybersecurity company RSA).
58. Id.
59. See Kim Zetter, Hack of Google, Adobe Conducted Through Zero-Day IE Flaw, WIRED THREAT LEVEL
(Jan. 14, 2010, 2:27 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/01/hack-of-adob (describing how advanced
infiltration of numerous corporate networks by actors possibly inside China circumvented companies’
defensive measures). The Maginot Line was a series of fortifications France built up along its borders before
World War II. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 747 (11th ed. 2007).
60. DAVID SALOMON, ELEMENTS OF COMPUTER SECURITY 157–58 (Ian Mackie ed., 2010) (reasoning that
anti-virus software should be regularly updated due to the rapid and constant appearance of new malware).
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the initial compromise is often impossible.61 With technology that can detect, assess,
and contain the attackers, though, the damage that would otherwise arise out of
such an attack — if not the attack itself — can often be prevented.62
With the right equipment and personnel, an entity attacked even by one of the
advanced, state-sponsored hackers can sometimes locate the command and control
(often referred to as “C2”) channel used by the attackers to communicate with the
malware installed on the network.63 These C2 channels often communicate through
C2 servers controlled exclusively by the attackers.64
The temptation to try to access or destroy those C2 servers can be strong since
doing so would disrupt the attackers’ communication with the malware infecting
your network.65 Such a response would be of questionable legality, though, and
would likely be considered an offensive act.66
Responses that are more likely to constitute “active defense” include poisoning
documents or other files that you know may be exfiltrated by the attackers.67 These
files can either contain malware designed to shut down or slow the attackers, or just
web-bugs — HTML links back to a web server you control — so that you can see

61. See CLAY WILSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32114, BOTNETS, CYBERCRIME, AND CYBERTERRORISM:
VULNERABILITIES AND POLICY ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 25 (2008) (defining a “Zero-Day exploit” as a cyberattack
that occurs when “a computer hacker discovers a new software vulnerability and launches a malicious attack to
infect computers before a security patch can be created by the software vendor and distributed to protect
users”); see also Randal C. Picker, Cybersecurity: Of Heterogeneity and Autarchy, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
CYBERSECURITY 115, 118 (Mark Grady & Francesco Parisi eds., 2006) (stating a developing problem that “the
time between knowledge of the vulnerability [of attack] and exploitation by a hacker is dropping, as hackers
pursue the zero-day exploit” defined as “no gap between knowledge of the vulnerability and malware that
exploits it” (citing David Bank, Computer Worm Is Turning Faster — Installing Security Patches Is Now Constant
Rush Job Against Speedier Invaders, WALL ST. J., May 27, 2004, at B3)).
62. See SALOMON, supra note 60, at 156–73 (describing various technologies to combat malware).
63. NICHOLAS IANELLI & AARON HACKWORTH, CERT COORDINATION CENTER, BOTNETS AS A VEHICLE FOR
ONLINE CRIME (2005), available at http://www.cert.org/archive/pdf/Botnets.pdf (explaining that by performing
runtime analysis on malicious code, users may be able to capture information on the attackers, perhaps
including the domain name for the command and control server and a channel name and password). For a
thorough discussion of the advanced persistent threat, see MANDIANT, APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber
Espionage Units (2013), http://intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant_APT1_Report.pdf.
64. See id. at 16–20 (describing botnet command and control).
65. But see INTERNET SEC. ALLIANCE, SOCIAL CONTRACT 2.0: A 21ST CENTURY PROGRAM FOR EFFECTIVE
CYBER SECURITY 24 (2010), available at http://www.isalliance.org/isa-publications/ (“Perhaps the best way to
address this new reality is to recognize that attackers will get into your network and to expand defensive actions
to detect, disrupt, and deny an attacker’s command and control (C2) communications back out to the
network.”).
66. Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Thinking Through Active Defense in Cyberspace, in PROCEEDINGS OF A
WORKSHOP ON DETERRING CYBERATTACKS: INFORMING STRATEGIES AND DEVELOPING OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
327, 328 (The National Academies Press ed., 2010) [hereinafter Kesan & Hayes, Thinking Through] (stating that
counterstrikes have been going on for the past decade or more despite the fact that “such counterstrikes are of
questionable legality under the current regime”).
67. Menn, supra note 49.
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from where your documents are being viewed.68 Camouflaging systems or creating
honeypots designed to misdirect hackers may also be considered active defenses.69
B. Policy
Private entities often prepare for the possibility of an attack by employing various
security measures. These can include network design, encryption, device- and
network-based authentication and verification measures, keeping security up to
date and installing patches, and enforcing best practices for the use of technology.70
An important component of preparation for a cyberattack is the deployment of
strong authentication and authorization measures.71
During an attack, the primary goal of the targeted entity is to stop or mitigate
the attack, rather than to gather evidence that may be used later.72 How to stop or
mitigate an attack is dependent on its nature and scope, requiring data-gathering
and assessment. Private companies in the U.S. “generally ha[ve] real-time intrusion
detection systems and prevention procedures.”73
Some companies respond to detected attacks with purely passive, defensive
practices. For instance, an entity that knows it is under attack will often seek to
identify the vulnerabilities that the attacker is exploiting and patch or rectify them
— perhaps by raising security standards or requiring a greater extent of user
authentication.74 The targeted entity may also seek to identify the attacker and
determine what techniques the attacker is using; one type of passive defense is a
“honeypot,” a “decoy site[ ] designed to attract hackers to discover their attack
techniques, and potentially their identities.”75

68. See John Gilroy, Ask The Computer Guy, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2002, at H07 (describing a web bug as “a
small, nearly invisible object on a Web page that can . . . relay data about your activity at that page to the
outside Web site it’s hosted at. This information could include such details as the Internet protocol address of
the computer you’re using . . . .”).
69. See SALOMON, supra note 60, at 295 (stating, “[a] honeypot is a server that acts as a decoy, attracting
hackers in order to study their methods and monitor their activities. Security workers use honeypots to collect
valuable information about new methods and tricks employed by hackers to break into computers”).
70. See Peter Swire, A Model for When Disclosure Helps Security: What is Different About Computer and
Network Security?, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CYBERSECURITY 29, 45–48, 61 (Mark Grady & Francesco
Parisi eds., 2006) (discussing encryption and patching); see also Joel Trachtman, Global Cyberterrorism,
Jurisdiction, and International Organization, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CYBERSECURITY 259, 265–66 (Mark
Grady & Francesco Parisi eds., 2006) (discussing verification and authentication).
71. See Clark & Landau, supra note 30, at 34 (“[P]utting tools in place to implement good authentication
and authorization is [sic] part of good security.”).
72. Id.
73. Kesan & Hayes, Mitigative Counterstriking, supra note 28, at 462–63. For more on intrusion detection
systems (IDS), see Kesan & Hayes, Thinking Through, supra note 66, at 330–31 (“IDS works partly by detecting
patterns of attack by a particular attacker, so there is a challenge in detecting intrusions when the intrusion is
being executed remotely by one person attacking through thousands of compromised computers in a botnet.”).
74. See SALOMON, supra note 60, at 209–31 (discussing authentication techniques).
75. Kesan & Hayes, Mitigative Counterstriking, supra note 28, at 471–72.
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Commentators have described sole reliance on passive defenses as akin to a
“duck and cover” approach, and suggested that targeted entities must meet force
with force in order to repel cyberattacks.76 Conceptually, active defense techniques
can be sorted into three categories: (i) those where the victim redirects the
attacker’s attack back at the attacker;77 (ii) those where the victim seeks to destroy,
disable, or gain control of the systems of the attacker using their own attacks;78 and
(iii) those that are undertaken by an intended victim, preemptively, akin to the
Stuxnet virus.79 Although details are murky, active defense techniques have
reportedly been deployed by governments, targeted entities, and security firms.80
An example of an active defense technique not involving attribution problems
would be: “In the event of a [distributed denial of service] attack via a botnet, two
potential neutralization responses may involve sending a [denial of service] attack
at the botnet controller or hacking the botnet controller and thereby taking control
of the botnet.”81 Other techniques might include sending a virus to or packetflooding an attacker.82
Active defense encompasses three elements: detection, traceback, and
counterstrike.83 If an entity determines that it is under attack, it will use a type of
traceroute called “traceback” to determine the source of the attack.84 The four major
techniques for Internet Protocol (IP) traceback are active probing, Internet Control
Message Protocol (ICMP) traceback, packet marking, and log-based traceback.85
However, attackers often use elusive techniques, such as IP spoofing, to attempt to

76. Id. at 417–18 (suggesting that the futile “duck and cover” approach used by American school children
in the 1950s to protect against nuclear attacks is comparable to the passive defense approaches used by Internet
users in that they both have questionability utility in the face of an attack).
77.
See supra notes 49, 69, and text accompanying note 75 (detailing the use of bogus files and honeypots
as active defense mechanisms).
78. See W. Earl Boebert, A Survey of Challenges in Attribution, in PROCEEDINGS OF A WORKSHOP ON
DETERRING CYBERATTACKS: INFORMING STRATEGIES AND DEVELOPING OPTIONS FOR U.S. STRATEGY 41, 48 (2010)
(contemplating increased use of counterattacks, or “hack backs”).
79. See id. at 49 (“A further step in active defense is to mount preemptive covert operations against sites
that are suspected to be planning or preparing attacks.”). The Stuxnet virus, for example, targeted Iranian
nuclear enrichment facilities as part of an effort to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. Sanger, supra
note 3.
80. See, e.g., William J. Lynn, III, Deputy Sec’y of Def., Remarks on Cyber at the RSA Conference (Feb. 15,
2011) (confirming the deployment of active defense techniques to protect U.S. military networks); see also
Kesan & Hayes, Thinking Through, supra note 66, at 333–34 (discussing that there are advantages to allowing
targeted entities and attacked firms to counterattack as well as benefits to giving the government the right to
carry out active defense strategies).
81. Kesan & Hayes, Mitigative Counterstriking, supra note 28, at 475.
82. Id. at 476.
83. Id. at 475 (showing that active defense includes intrusion detection systems, traceback, and
counterstriking).
84. A traceroute is “the most widely used diagnostic tool on the Internet” and allows individuals to identify
the source of an attack. Id. at 482.
85. Id. (citing Youg Guan, Network Forensics, in COMPUTER AND INFORMATION SECURITY HANDBOOK 339,
341–42 (John R. Vacca ed., 2009)).
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thwart traceback, and although private entities and the government are reported to
be actively innovating to improve traceback capabilities, these innovations are
understandably shrouded in secrecy at present.86
Although the Stuxnet virus was more likely a response to the threat of a kinetic
(nuclear) attack rather than a response to a cyberattack perpetrated by Iran,87 it
represents a valuable example of both a technique and a context of active defense
that may be relevant for private entity responses. In terms of technique, Stuxnet was
a virus designed to move across numerous systems and devices but to target only
certain specific systems, therefore limiting the potential for collateral damage.88 In
terms of context, Stuxnet was likely a preemptive strike on systems believed to be in
preparation for use in future kinetic attacks.89 If private entities become aware of
credible threats of imminent cyberattacks, they may very well seek to respond
preemptively. Particularly when striking preemptively, however, private entities
must be confident in their attribution techniques.

IV. Legal Issues Affecting Active Defense and Attribution
A. Self-Defense in Domestic Jurisprudence
Much of our law around self-defense evolved from English common law.90 The
fundamentals, however, date back much further. In the thirteenth century, for
example, Thomas Aquinas posited that when an immediate risk arises that does not
allow enough time for recourse to a superior (e.g., law enforcement), the use of
force in an act of self-defense may be justified.91 By the sixteenth century, the notion
of chance-medley had developed, which was also called “chaud-medley” and

86. Id. at 483.
87. The Stuxnet virus “temporarily took out nearly 1,000 of the 5,000 centrifuges Iran had spinning at the
time to purify uranium.” Sanger, supra note 3.
88. See Nate Anderson, Confirmed: US and Israel Created Stuxnet, Lost Control of It, ARS TECHNICA (June 1,
2012, 6:00 AM), http://www.arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/06/confirmed-us-israel-created-stuxnet-lostcontrol-of-it/ (reporting that the goal of Stuxnet “was to break Iranian nuclear centrifuge equipment by issuing
specific commands to the industrial control hardware responsible for their spin rate”).
89. See Sanger, supra note 3 (indicating that the Stuxnet virus was “America’s most ambitious attempt to
slow the progress of Iran’s nuclear efforts . . . .”); see also Perlroth, supra note 4 (noting that security researchers
uncovered evidence that Stuxnet was aimed at Iranian industrial control systems in order to weaken Iran’s plans
to build a nuclear bomb).
90. See Cathryn Jo Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting a Historical Accident on Behalf of Battered
Women Who Kill, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 11, 25–33 (1986) (discussing the history of the law of self-defense,
stemming from the common law, as it transitioned to the modern definition in the United States).
91. See Michael Skopets, Comment, Battered Nation Syndrome: Relaxing the Imminence Requirement of
Self-Defense in International Law, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 753, 759 n.23 (2006) (“Saint Thomas Aquinas proposed
that the use of force in self-defense was justified in the case of a risk so immediate that it ‘does not allow enough
time to be able to have recourse to a superior.’” (quoting Thomas Aquinas, Treatise on Law 61 (Richard J.
Regan ed. & trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 2000) (1272))).
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eventually became merged with the concept of manslaughter.92 Chance-medley
applied in situations where two people got into an avoidable altercation: an
argument escalating into a bar fight, for example.93 If such a situation was to escalate
into violence, one person attacked by another may need to make a split second
decision whether to kill or be killed. A claim of self-defense could be made but
would only be found justified if the evidence showed that the eventual killer had
attempted retreat, if retreat was possible.94
Two hundred years later, William Blackstone asserted that defense of oneself or
a member of one’s family would be acceptable by society if one “be forcibly
attacked in his person or property.”95 Moreover, the inability of the “future process
of law” to address the immediacy of the situation justifies opposing “one violence
with another.”96 Any responsibility for such actions would fall only to the person
who began the attack in the first place. Thus, as a “primary law of nature,” a person
can resort to self-defense as long as the force used does not exceed the defensive
purpose of the action.97 Otherwise, “the defender would himself become an
aggressor.”98 Setting an appropriate balance provided a fertile ground for many
commentators when analyzing various crimes.
When the common law migrated to America, the notion of chance-medley did
not follow.99 The individual rights espoused in the Bill of Rights were clearly present
in the development of the doctrine of “stand your ground.”100 In the 1895 case of
Beard v. United States, the Supreme Court addressed the following question: “Does
the law hold a man who is violently and feloniously assaulted responsible for having
brought such necessity upon himself on the sole ground that he failed to fly from

92. Richard Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: I-Provocation, Emotional Disturbance, and the Model Penal
Code, 27 B.C. L. REV. 243, 250–51, 250 n.34 (1986). Chance-medley is “accidental homicide not entirely without
fault of the killer but without evil intent.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 206 (11th ed. 2007).
93. Id. at 250–51; see also Jean K. Gilles Phillips & Elizabeth Cateforis, Self-Defense: What’s a Jury Got to Do
with It?, 57 KAN. L. REV. 1143, 1158 (2009) (describing this historical claim of self-defense in the context of a
fight).
94. Garrett Epps, Further Development, Any Which Way But Loose: Interpretive Strategies and Attitudes
Toward Violence in the Evolution of the Anglo-American “Retreat Rule,” LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. Winter 1992,
at 303, 309–10.
95. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *3.
96. Id. at *4.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Epps, supra note 94, at 311.
100. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592–93 (2008) (finding that “the historical
background of the Second Amendment” shows that the English Bill of Rights, which gave Protestants the right
to have arms for self-defense purposes, was “the predecessor to our Second Amendment”); see also Nicholas J.
Johnson, Self-Defense?, 2 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 187, 188 (2006) (“The imbedded self-defense question has been
central to the Second Amendment debate of the last few decades. Most legal scholars who have considered the
question conclude that the amendment secures an individual right to arms that includes a personal right to selfdefense.”).
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his assailant when he might safely have done so?”101 The Court found that a victim
could legally exercise his or her right of self-defense without having to at least
attempt to flee.102
Thus, what began as the “castle doctrine,” which held that a person attacked by
an intruder in the person’s home has no duty to retreat and could use deadly force
to repel an attack,103 evolved into the “stand your ground” doctrine that applies to
situations other than the home.104 A little more than 100 years ago, an Oklahoma
court ruled:
Under the old common law, no man could defend himself until he had
retreated, and until his back was to the wall; but this is not the law in free
America. Here the wall is to every man’s back. It is the wall of his rights;
and when he is [assailed] at a place where he has a right to be . . . he may
stand and defend himself.105
Much more recently, self-defense law has undergone some very public scrutiny
due to the Trayvon Martin case.106 That case dealt with a change in the Florida law
related to self-defense, statutorily establishing the concept of “stand your
ground.”107 Thus, the contours of self-defense continue to be tested and refined.
Reaching consensus on applying the concepts of self-defense to the cyber
domain has proven to be a difficult task, though not for the lack of trying.108
Proponents argue that just as a person has a right to defend oneself against
imminent harm (whether or not retreat has been attempted, though analogies exist
there as well), so does the owner of a cyber asset under attack.109 In particular, since
a computer network cannot “retreat,” the notion of stand-your-ground described
above becomes even more germane. Critics argue that active defense (a) lacks clear

101. Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550, 561 (1895).
102. Id. at 563–64.
103. Runyan v. State, 57 Ind. 80, 84 (Ind. 1877).
104. Recent Development, Florida Legislation—The Controversy Over Florida’s New “Stand Your Ground”
Law—Fla. Stat. § 776.013 (2005), 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 351, 355 (2005).
105. Fowler v. State, 126 P. 831, 833 (Okla. Crim. App. 1912).
106. See, e.g., Rene Stutzman, Police Say Teen Hit Zimmerman; Man Claims He Was Beaten, Injured, SUNSENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Mar. 27, 2012, at 1A (“[George] Zimmerman told police he shot [Trayvon
Martin] in self-defense”); see also Sari Horwitz & Stephanie McCrummen, Trayvon Martin Documents Reveal
New Details in Shooting, WASH. POST, May 17, 2012, at A01 (noting that the case was “provoking nationwide
debates over . . . self-defense laws”).
107. FLA. STAT. § 776.013 (2012).
108. See, e.g., Nakashima, supra note 9 (“In the debate over how best to defend the nation against
cyberattacks, one of the main points of tension relates to the extent to which the government should be able to
deploy ‘active defenses.’”).
109. See, e.g., Kesan & Hayes, Thinking Through, supra note 66, at 330.
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rules110 and (b) could easily escalate into a situation beyond the control of the
attacked party.111
As a further obstacle to the use of active defense, there are international
considerations preventing domestic activities. The Neutrality Act provides that no
private entity can take action against a nation-state with which the United States is
at peace.112 Thus, if a cyberattack (e.g., along the lines of Stuxnet or Flame) was
attributable to a nation-state against whom the U.S. was not at war, a private party
would be prohibited from taking action directly against that nation-state.113 In such
a scenario, attribution becomes critically important. The likelihood is high,
however, that a nation-state would be incentivized to carefully cover its tracks. In
most cases, the nation-state would probably not even directly be involved. Instead,
the nation-state would likely utilize an entity that would guarantee that the nationstate could claim plausible deniability that it was the source of the attack.114
B. Self-Defense in International Law
Because cyberattacks are commonly carried out by actors and computers outside
the United States, it is instructive to consider the international bases for justifiable
self-defense as between nation-states. While this article focuses on the private
sector, given the interconnected nature of the Internet, it is possible that either (i)
systems and networks employed for active defense are State-controlled or regulated;
(ii) that active defense is authorized, potentially even carried out through the aid of
a nation-state; or (iii) there are many quasi-governmental organizations serving
dual roles, sometimes serving in a public capacity of the state, but simultaneously
operate privately.115 Thus, international law is necessarily implicated not only to
instruct situations involving State action, but also companies using active defense
would want to ensure their measures were not violative of international law, or at
least be aware of the implications of their actions.
110. See Kesan & Hayes, Mitigative Counterstriking, supra note 28, at 479 (discussing how it is difficult for
the attack victim to determine when an attack is in progress).
111. Graham supra, note 24, at 97–98; see also Kesan & Hayes, Mitigative Counterstriking, supra note 28, at
478–79.
112. 18 U.S.C. § 960 (2006).
113. Id. (prohibiting a private party from taking any part in a military or naval expedition against a country
with which the United States is at peace).
114. See Cassandra M. Kirsch, Science Fiction No More: Cyber Warfare and the United States, 40 DENV. J.
INT’L L. & POL’Y 620, 634 (2012) (observing that the party behind a cyber espionage plot based in China was
entitled to plausible deniability because it could not be determined whether an entity other than the Chinese
government was responsible); Kelly J. Higgins, Attackers Engage in ‘False Flag’ Attack Manipulation, SECURITY
DARK READING (Oct. 1, 2012, 6:39 PM), http://www.darkreading.com/threat-intelligence/167901121/security/
attacks-breaches/240008256/attackers-engage-in-false-flag-attack-manipulation.html (noting that skilled
hackers were used as militias-for-hire to attack other nation-states).
115. See infra Part IV.B.3 (noting that a coordination between a Russian criminal organization and a
Russian intelligence agency may have been responsible for a cyberattack); Part V.A (asserting that there are
instances where private organizations are funded by state governments to carry out cyberattacks).
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The basis of self-defense in international law is founded upon Article 2(4) of the
United Nations Charter, which prohibits the use of force by one state against
another, with one exception being when acting in self-defense, responding to an
armed attack under Article 51.116 This exception is relevant to the analysis here,
raising the question of whether cyber intrusions are a use of force, an armed attack,
or something different altogether. As scholars of jus ad bellum have correctly
illustrated, there is a difference between what can be considered a use of force under
Article 2(4)117 and what is considered an ‘armed attack’ for purposes of self-defense
under Article 51118 — a difference that has consequences for the lawfulness of any
operative countermeasure, including cyber.
1. Jus Ad Bellum119 Background
The most common analytical approach to determining the difference between an
armed attack or use of force involves assessing the gravity of the act, “to distinguish
the most grave forms of the use of force (those constituting an armed attack) from
other less grave forms,”120 as the International Court of Justice stated in Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua).121 The Court held that
sending armed bands (e.g., the contras from El Salvador into Nicaragua), as
opposed to a regular army, could constitute an armed attack, whereas providing
assistance to rebels in the form of weapons or logistical or other support (i.e., U.S.
support to contras in El Salvador) would not constitute an armed attack.122 Rather,
the latter could be regarded as a threat or use of force, or intervention in the affairs
of another State.123 The Court relied on the “scale and effects” of the operation to
help differentiate between a use of force and an armed attack, suggesting that mere
“frontier incidents” would not rise to the level of an armed attack.124

116. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 & art. 51.
117. See Matthew C. Waxman, Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force: Back to the Future of Article 2(4), 36 YALE
J. INT’L L. 421, 426–29 (2011) (discussing three different interpretations of Article 2(4)).
118. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 195
(June 27) (assessing the meaning of “armed attack” in the context of the international law of self-defense); Oil
Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶ 63–64 (Nov. 6) (same); Tom Ruys, ‘ARMED ATTACK’ AND ARTICLE 51
OF THE UN CHARTER 139–42 (2010) (observing that the scale and effects of an armed attack distinguish it from
less grave forms of the use of force).
119. Jus ad bellum translates from Latin to “justice of war” and regulates the pre-hostilities conduct of going
to war. RICHARD P. DIMEGLIO ET AL., LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT DESKBOOK 8, available at http://www.loc.gov/
rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/LOAC-Deskbook-2012.pdf.
120. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 91 (June
27); see also Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, 101 (Nov. 6).
121. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 91 (June
27); see also Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, 101 (Nov. 6).
122. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 103–04
(June 27).
123. Id. at 104.
124. Id. at 103.
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The line between frontier incidents and armed attacks is blurry at best, even
within the ICJ’s own jurisprudence. The Court has suggested that mining a single
warship could constitute an armed attack in certain circumstances,125 but has
generally maintained a conservative approach both to the concept of armed attack
and to the genesis of the attack (i.e., that it must reflect State action or be carried
out by those operating on its behalf) — relevant to a discussion of attribution.126
Thus, a right of self-defense can be invoked as an exception to the prohibition of
use of force only if an ‘armed attack’ occurs because the drafters of the U.N. Charter
in 1945 recognized only a limited right of self-defense.127 The basis for this narrow
approach is that a use of force “not tantamount to an armed attack is simply not of
‘sufficient gravity,’” because an armed attack “presupposes a use of force producing
(or liable to produce) serious consequences, epitomized by territorial intrusions,
human casualties or considerable destruction of property.”128 In essence, selfdefense is a “remedy of last resort in a situation in which all alternatives for the
peaceful vindication of a recognized legal right have been exhausted and the law

125. See Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, 191 (Nov. 6) (holding that the mining of a United
States-flagged warship was not an armed attack against the United States because there was no evidence it was
laid with the intention of targeting the United States). But see, e.g., Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 22–23
(Apr. 9) (holding that Albania was responsible for the explosions of British warships because it failed to warn
the vessels of the danger that the vessels were heading towards).
126. See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 139 (July 9) (finding Israel’s construction of a wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory was contrary to international law); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 104 (June 27). Cf. S.C. Res. 1368, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001)
(noting that threats to international peace and security were caused by terrorist acts, recognizing the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defense in accordance with the U.N. Charter); S.C. Res. 1373, ¶ 2, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) (noting that threats to international peace and security were caused by
terrorist acts, and reaffirming individual or collective self-defense in resolution 1368); Statement by the North
Atlantic Council, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Sept. 11, 2001), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SIDD22D8FC5-11B5DDD9/natolive/official_texts_18863.htm (regarding authorization of self-defense in the
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks).
127. See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 365–67 (1963)
(discussing when the use of force might be necessary in a conflict); AHMED RIFFAT, INTERNATIONAL
AGGRESSION: A STUDY OF THE LEGAL CONCEPT 124–26 (1979) (determining that there are limited cases where an
armed attach occurs against member states).
128. YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 193 (4th ed. 2005) (quoting G.A. Res. 3314
(XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., 29(1) RGA 143 (1974)(Article 2 Definition of Aggression). An earlier edition
of the same title had explained an “armed attack” as “a use of force causing human casualties and/or serious
destruction of property,” but notably this definition was expanded in the latest version. YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR,
AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 174 (3d ed. 2001). Dinstein posits that a restrictive interpretation is necessary
because “[a]ny other interpretation” of Article 2(4) “would be counter-textual, counter-factual and counterlogical:” counter-textual because the use of the phrase ‘armed attack’ in Article 51 is not inadvertent and a
threat of force was not covered in the General Assembly’s Definition of Aggression in 1974; counter-factual
because at the time of the drafting international customary law had consolidated its allowance of self-defense, in
particular because there were no occurrences of preventive self-defense at the time; and counter-logical because
the purpose of Article 51 was to introduce limitations on the exercise of self-defense. See YORAM DINSTEIN,
WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 183–85 (4th ed. 2005).
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and the facts indisputably support a plea of extreme necessity.”129 This latter
construction would be particularly useful in the commercial context.
Some argue, in contrast, that the gravity of the act is relevant to the necessity and
proportionality of the response, but not to whether the act constituted an armed
attack at all.130 This broader view argues that the ‘inherent’ right of self-defense
encapsulates earlier notions of self-defense existing in customary international law
because at the time of its drafting, the U.N. Charter did not limit pre-existing rights
of states, at least without explicitly doing so.131 In analogizing from traditional jus ad
bellum analysis to cyber issues, policy considerations can also be helpful. First, a
narrow reading of armed attack leaves aggrieved parties with few options to protect
their interests in the wake of a forcible measure short of an armed attack.132 Second,
some argue that restrictive self-defense options eliminate one avenue for limiting
low-level uses of force, thus encouraging low-intensity conflicts and, ultimately,
increased violence in international politics.133 Alternatively, the ICJ’s distinction
between frontier incidents and armed attacks can serve to limit third-party States’
involvement (i.e., the U.S. on behalf of Honduras and Costa Rica), thereby
eliminating collective self-defense in the absence of an armed attack, while not
necessarily negating the contentions of a particular victim state’s own recourse (i.e.,
Honduras and Costa Rica directly).134
The consequence of the narrow reading of Article 2(4) and the Nicaragua
decision in this regard is that the options for an aggrieved party to protect its
interest in the wake of a forcible measure short of an armed attack are limited.135
U.N. equanimity towards self-help has been described as a “remedy of last resort in
a situation in which all alternatives for the peaceful vindication of a recognized legal

129. THOMAS FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS AND ARMED ATTACKS 131–32
(2002) (asserting that the systemic recognition of a margin of flexibility approximating consensus that facts,
evidence, and sensitivity to political context shape responses to self-help claims). Compare id. at 133 (noting
that in the Corfu Channel case, the ICJ held the British navy’s military countermeasures as unlawful, yet it did
accept that extreme necessity could mitigate the legal consequences of the illegality of those acts if necessity
were demonstrable by clear contextual evidence), with id. at 130–31 (noting that Argentina was unable to
legitimize its invasion of the Falkland Islands to a majority on the U.N. Security Council based on historic title
and anti-colonialism).
130. See William H. Taft IV, Self-Defense and the Oil Platforms Decision, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 295, 300 (2004)
(“The gravity of an attack may affect the proper scope of the defensive use of force . . . but it is not relevant to
determining whether there is a right of self-defense in the first instance.”).
131. W. MICHAEL RIESMAN, LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 39–40 (Damrosch &
Scheffer eds., 1991).
132. See Thomas Franck, Some Observations on the ICJ’s Procedural and Substantive Innovations, 81 AM. J.
INT’L L. 116, 120 (1987).
133. See id. (noting that due to the holding in Nicaragua, which limited the scope of an “armed attack,”
victimized states are left with little recourse against states, who are given a “free ride” and are “legally
invulnerable,” where minor insurgencies are directed from).
134. See CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 130 (2000) (describing how the
United States believed that it was justified in its use of force against Nicaragua, but the ICJ disagreed).
135. Franck, supra note 132, at 120.
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right have been exhausted and the law and the facts indisputably support a plea of
extreme necessity.”136 Nonetheless, because a use of force can embrace acts, such as
arming or training guerillas, which fall short of an armed attack, it leaves open the
possibility that non-physically destructive activities, especially cyber operations
would fall into this category as well.
For this reason, assessing the parameters of the use of force and armed attack has
particular relevance in the cyber arena. While there may be disagreement as to the
particular application, jus ad bellum has been accepted by international law experts
as being applicable to cyberattacks.137 The following section is a brief survey of the
main analytical approaches to cyber ops and jus ad bellum, as they may be relevant
to active defense.
2. Cyber Operations as a Use of Force
Certain cyber-related terms, such as “cyberattack” or “active defense,” do not
appear in any of the formative writings concerning the use of force — naturally,
given the vast technological developments of the past several decades.138 The
conventional means of waging war usually referenced in Article 2(4) analyses are
typically grouped by the type of instrument used (e.g., gun or missile) to represent

136. FRANCK, supra note 129, at 131–32 (asserting that the systemic recognition of a margin of flexibility
approximating consensus that facts, evidence, and sensitivity to political context shape responses to self-help
claims). Compare id. at 133 (noting that in the Corfu Channel case, the ICJ held the British navy’s military
countermeasures as unlawful, yet it did accept that extreme necessity could mitigate the legal consequences of
the illegality of those acts if necessity were demonstrable by clear contextual evidence), with id. at 130–31
(noting Argentina was unable to legitimize its invasion of the Falkland Islands to a majority on the U.N.
Security Council based on historic title and anti-colonialism).
137. See INT’L GRP. EXPERTS, N. ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. COOP. CYBER DEF. CTR. EXCELLENCE, THE TALLINN
MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE 19 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., forthcoming
2013) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL], available at http://issuu.com/nato_ccd_coe/docs/tallinn_manual_draft
(noting that the International Group of Experts behind the Tallinn Manual unanimously believed that jus ad
bellum applied to cyber operations).
138. THOMAS C. WINGFIELD, WHEN IS A CYBERATTACK AND ARMED ATTACK: LEGAL THRESHOLD FOR
DISTINGUISHING MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN CYBERSPACE (2006), which explains that the term “CNA” — also
referred to “cyber war” — is a type of Information Warfare (IW), which is itself a subset of Information
Operations (IO). He notes that the difference between IO and IW is that IO “may be undertaken at any level of
conflict (strategic, operational, or tactical) and at any time during the resort to force (peace, crisis, or war).”
However, IW “includes only those operations conducted in crises or wartime,” and thus would be applicable
only to jus in bello analysis. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., JOINT PUB. 1-02, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF
MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 2 (2012) (defining IO as “the integrated employment of the core capabilities
of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and
operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt
or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own”); see also Kenneth B.
Moss, Information Warfare and War Powers: Keeping the Constitutional Balance, 26 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF.
239, 241 (2002) (defining IW as “conducted during time of crisis or conflict to achieve or promote specific
objectives over a specific adversary or conflict”).
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“kinetic impact.”139 It has been well reported that the wide variety of effects caused
by “cyberattacks,”140 spanning from those that cause financial damage to those that
manipulate aspects of a national’s critical infrastructure, “can influence the course
of conflict between governments, between citizens, and between government and
civil society.”141 Unsurprisingly in the non-kinetic cyber-context, military operators,
policy-makers, and now corporate CIOs and CSOs, can find it to be a difficult
process to know whether they have engaged in an activity that is a “threat or use of
force,” or conversely, whether they are a victim.142
While there are no definitive criteria for what constitutes a “threat or use of
force,”143 many commentators generally agree that a use of force may be nonkinetic, such that it encompasses cyber operations.144 The “Schmitt Analysis” is
considered the most widely accepted normative framework for considering whether

139. See Jason Barkham, Comment, Information Warfare and International Law on the Use of Force, 34
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 57, 70–72 (2001) (discussing Article 2 and its grouping of the types of force into
categories such as kinetic).
140. Note that this memo will primarily refer to “cyberattack,” but will occasionally use other references to
“cyber operation,” “information operation,” and “cyber network attack,” with a synonymous meaning (as
would any citing sources’ use of the term “cyberattack”). An interdisciplinary study conducted by the National
Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies defines the term as follows:
Cyberattack refers to the use of deliberate actions—perhaps over an extended period of time—to
alter, disrupt, deceive, degrade, or destroy adversary computer systems or networks or the
information and/or programs resident in or transiting these systems or networks. Such effects on
adversary systems and networks may also have indirect effects on entities coupled to or reliant on
them. A cyberattack seeks to cause adversary computer systems and networks to be unavailable
or untrustworthy and therefore less useful to the adversary. Furthermore, because so many
different kinds of cyberattack are possible, the term ‘cyberattack’ should be understood as a
statement about a methodology for action—and that alone—rather than as a statement about
the scale of the action’s effect.
COMM. ON OFFENSIVE INFO. WARFARE, supra note 10, at 10–11.
141. Kenneth Geers, Sun Tzu and Cyber War, N. ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. COOP. CYBER DEF. CTR.
EXCELLENCE (Feb. 9, 2011), available at http://www.ccdcoe.org/articles/2011/Geers_SunTzuandCyberWar.pdf.
142. See Kesan & Hayes, Mitigative Counterstriking, supra note 28, at 479.
143. See Waxman, supra note 117, at 427–30 (discussing various approaches about how to categorize threats
of force).
144. The threshold for non-kinetic activity as a use of force has been authoritatively discussed three times.
The first occurred during the San Francisco drafting conference in 1945, in regards to a proposal by Brazil to
include economic coercion, which was decisively rejected after being considered. 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 344
(1945). Next, the topic came up during the U.N. General Assembly’s Declaration on Friendly Relations, in
which was decided that “[a]ll forms of pressure, including those of a political or economic character, which
have the effect of threatening the territorial integrity or political independence of any State” would not all be
uses of force. U.N. GAOR Special Comm. on Friendly Relations, U.N. Doc. A/AC.125/SR.114 (1970); see also
Report of the Special Committee on Friendly Relations, U.N. Doc. A/7619 20, 32–33 (1969). In that respect,
purely economic harm or political pressure would not constitute a use of force on its own. Thus, a cyber
operation akin to psychological coercion would not qualify as being a prohibited use of force. Lastly, the ICJ
held on this issue in the Nicaragua case that whereas arming and training a guerrilla force, a non-kinetic
activity, was a use of force, the slight funding of that force was not a use of force. Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 118–19 (June 27).
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a cyberattack has risen to the level of a “use of force.”145 This seven-prong test
addresses both the quantitative aspects of attacks, such as the amount of damage
incurred, and the qualitative aspects, such as the nature/quality of the cyber
operation in question.146 To do so, the test applies a quantitative figure (e.g., a oneto-ten scale, whereby averages above a six may be definitely considered a use of
force, below a four are definitely not, and in between four and six are debatable) to
seven qualitative factors:
1. Severity (e.g., number of casualties, area/scope of attack, damage
within area/intensity);
2. Immediacy (e.g., duration of attack, moment effects surfaced, and
period of effects);
3. Directness (e.g., actual and proximate causation);
4. Invasiveness (e.g., physical or electronic border crossing, locus of
action);
5. Measurability (e.g., quantifiable effects, level of certainty);
6. Presumptive legitimacy (e.g., acceptance within the international
community, resemblance to kinetic attack); and
7. Responsibility (e.g., attribution)147

145. This framework can be found in Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in
International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885, 914–16 (1999)
[hereinafter Schmitt, Normative Framework]. For support of the framework, see Matthew J. Sklerov, The
Dilemma of State Responses to Cyberattacks: A Justification for the Use of Active Defenses Against States Who
Neglect Their Duty to Prevent, 201 MIL. L. REV. 1, 56–57 (2009) (citing the Schmitt Analysis as the most useful
approach to distinguishing uses of force in cyberspace). See also generally Stephen J. Cox, Confronting Threats
Through Unconventional Means: Offensive Information Warfare as a Covert Alternative to Preemptive War, 42
HOUS. L. REV. 881, 901 (2005) (discussing Schmitt’s innovative article); Eric Talbot Jensen, Computer Attacks on
Critical National Infrastructure: A Use of Force Invoking the Right of Self-Defense, 38 STAN. J. INT’L L. 207, 228
(2002) (approving Schmitt as the most accurate application of current international law, but proposing a
forward-looking view due to the unique cyber environment); Matthew Hoisington, Cyberwarfare and the Use of
Force Giving Rise to the Right of Self-Defense, 32 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 439, 448 (2009) (commenting
favorably on Schmitt, but discussing the difficulty of performing a legally sufficient review in the limited time
available for a an effective active defensive response in cyberspace).
146. Schmitt, Normative Framework, supra note 145, at 914–16; see Michael N. Schmitt, Cyber Operations in
International Law: The Use of Force, Collective Security, Self-Defense and Armed Conflicts, in PROCEEDINGS OF A
WORKSHOP ON DETERRING CYBERATTACKS: INFORMING STRATEGIES AND DEVELOPING OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
155–56 (2010) [hereinafter Schmitt, Cyber Operations].
147. Schmitt, Normative Framework, supra note 145, at 914–16 (listing the substantive points of the Schmitt
Analysis); see also James B. Michael et al., Measured Responses to Cyber Attacks Using Schmitt Analysis: A Case
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The final prong assessing responsibility serves as a reminder that attribution is a
vital consideration during the initial stages of assessing an attack by a victim state,
and when that victim retaliates with its own measures against an identified
aggressor state.148 The Schmitt Analysis allows approximation to techniques used in
characterizing traditional operations, so it also accounts for the technical realities
that often frustrate cyber analogies to the brick-and-mortar world, for instance the
likelihood of spoofed IP addresses.149 Because of the applicability of the Schmitt
factors to actions by private actors, it can be useful to compare and contrast to
active defense as applied to corporate or other private entities — the idea being that
the assessment is not operator-specific to only public actors.
This broad array of factors facilitates responses to the ever-changing dynamic of
cyberattacks. The computer network attack:
Spans the spectrum of consequentiality. Its effects freely range from mere
inconvenience (e.g., shutting down an academic network temporarily) to
physical destruction (e.g., as in creating a hammering phenomenon in oil
pipelines so as to cause them to burst) to death (e.g., shutting down power
to a hospital with no back-up generators).150
Notably, the Schmitt Analysis rejects the notion that the instrumentality or form of
cyber operations be dispositive; instead, it emphasizes Article 2(4)’s purpose, which
concerned the consequence or effect that uses of force would pose.151
Wide-support has established the Schmitt Analysis as a primary means to
construe cyberattacks in a jus ad bellum context.152 As some scholars have suggested,
besides being a practical “legal algorithm,” the test provides “a principled means” in
order to “organize analysis in something other than a quantum cloud of
uncertainty.”153 However, a variety of divergent views suggest there still is no bright
line rule for determining a use of force for cyber operations. On one end of this
spectrum, some experts suggest that the use of force prohibition cannot be
Study of Attack Scenarios for a Software-Intensive System, in PROC. 27TH ANN. INT’L COMPUTER SOFTWARE &
APPLICATIONS CONF. 621–27 (2003) (detailing and demonstrating, by way of example, the quantitative and
qualitative nature of the Schmitt Analysis).
148. See Schmitt, Cyber Operations, supra note 146, at 156–57 (defining responsibility in the context of the
Schmitt Analysis and providing an example).
149. Id. at 154–56 (arguing that traditional terminology can fit within the context of cyberattack law, and
then using that terminology to explain the different steps of the Schmitt Analysis).
150. Schmitt, Normative Framework, supra note 145, at 912.
151. Erik M. Mudrinch, Cyber 3.0: The Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace and the
Attribution Problem, 68 A.F. L. REV. 167, 191 (2012); Schmitt, Normative Framework, supra note 145, at 914–15.
152. See, e.g., Vida M. Antolin-Jenkins, Defining the Parameters of Cyberwar Operations: Looking for Law in
All the Wrong Places?, 51 NAVAL L. REV. 132, 168–72 (2005) (citing the Schmitt Analysis as an authoritative
source on what constitutes “use of force” in a cyber context); Waxman, supra note 117, at 432 (calling the
Schmitt Analysis “influential” in this regard); see also supra note 145 and accompanying text.
153. Michael, supra note 147, at 622–23.
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adequately addressed by the Schmitt Analysis or through any existing regimes in
current international law.154 Rather, they argue that the particular challenges of
cyber require an entirely new international framework.155 Although its critics raise
salient points, the Schmitt Analysis will likely remain the standard by nation-states
for determining when cyber operations amount to uses of force, especially given its
ease of use for military advisors.156 Moreover, it serves as a model that can be
adopted by private operators (e.g., CIOs and CSOs) to characterize the cyberattack
their organizations have suffered. In particular, it can allow those private operators
to incorporate a non-binary analysis of attribution into the broader calculus related
to a cyberattack.
3. Cyberattack Example: DDoS in Estonia
The massive distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack on Estonia in 2007 offers a
prime example for applying this analysis.157 The DDoS occurred following the
Estonian government’s decision to move a Soviet war memorial from the center of
its capital, Tallinn, to a military cemetery outside the city.158 A series of cyberattacks
were then undertaken against Estonia’s government and commercial information
systems, including those of the President and Parliament, banks, news agencies, and
Internet service providers (ISPs).159 The culprit behind the attack, according to news
reports, was either Russian Nashi hackers (a pro-Kremlin youth group), or the
Russian government itself, or possibly a coordination between them; however,
absolute attribution has yet to be established, or at least announced.160
154. See, e.g., Martin C. Libicki, CYBERDETERRENCE AND CYBERWAR iii (2009) (“Cyberspace is its own
medium with its own rules. . . . [D]eterrence and warfighting tenets established in other media do not
necessarily translate reliably into cyberspace.”); Duncan B. Hollis, Why States Need an International Law For
Information Operations, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1023, 1040–42 (2007) (“The use of force prohibition
encounters real difficulty . . . when translated into the [information operations] context.”).
155. See Hollis, supra note 154, at 1040–42 (2007) (explaining “the novelty of [information operation]
methods generates confusion regardless of the standard chosen,” and seeks a system of international law for
information operations, which could “rectify many of the deficiencies of the current legal system and provide
states with additional functional benefits that do not currently exist”).
156. See TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 137, at 47–49; Sklerov, supra note 145, at 56–57 (calling the Schmitt
Analysis “the most useful analytical framework for evaluating cyberattacks); see also Thomas C. Wingfield, THE
LAW OF INFORMATION CONFLICT: NATIONAL SECURITY LAW IN CYBERSPACE 101 (2000).
157. Schmitt himself has used Estonia as a point of reference for the Schmitt Analysis. Michael N. Schmitt,
Cyber Operations and the Jus Ad Bellum Revisited, 56 VILL. L. REV. 569, 577 (2011).
158. Estonia and Russia: A Cyber-Riot, ECONOMIST, May 2007, at 55, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/9163598.
159. Schmitt, Cyber Operations, supra note 146, at 151; see also ENEKEN TIKK ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CYBER
INCIDENTS: LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 14–33 (2010) (providing an in-depth look at the attacks, their background,
their effects, and lessons learned).
160. See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 817, 837–38, 854 (2012)
(noting that despite reports of Nashi involvement and suspicion of Russian government involvement,
“authorities never officially attributed the attack to a state”); Schmitt, Cyber Operations, supra note 146, at 151
(noting that experts have tracked the Estonia attacks to a number of Russian government institutions, but also
that the attacks had been “traced to at least 177 countries”); Charles Clover, Kremlin-Backed Group Behind
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The DDoS had the immediate effect of severely disrupting the operations of all
of Estonian society.161 The consequences went beyond inconvenience; they were
long-term and widespread, undermining confidence in the government and halting
economic activity for several days.162 They directly affected important individual
and state functions, preventing the access to funds and interfering with the
distribution of government benefits.163 The DDoS targeted systems that were
designed to be secure, and thus, necessarily operated highly invasively.164 The
consequences, albeit serious, were difficult to measure because the DDoS attacks
had the effect of stymieing activity, not destroying data.165 Although political and
economic attacks are presumptively legitimate under international law because they
are not considered uses of force, these cyberattacks did more than merely pressure
Estonia.166 The attacks intentionally frustrated civic functions.167
Forensic reports after the attacks have presented highly suggestive evidence of
Russian involvement.168 Additionally, the fact that Russian authorities refused to
cooperate with later Estonian investigative efforts, transferred geopolitical tensions
to presumptive guilt.169 Under the Schmitt Analysis the quantitative value
corresponding to attributing these attacks may be ranked as a six; albeit, not
irrefutable, such a value range provides a reasonable basis for implicating Russian
criminal groups and/or a rebuttable presumption of Russian-state involvement.170
This level of attribution could be viewed as “good enough” for carrying out a
countermeasure.
For the above reasons, many commentators find that the DDoS attack on
Estonia reached the use of force threshold.171 Under the Schmitt Analysis the

Estonian Cyber Blitz, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 11, 2009, at 8 (noting responsibility for the attack claimed by
Kremlin-backed Nashi hackers); Ian Traynor, Russia Accused of Unleashing Cyberwar to Disable Estonia,
GUARDIAN (London) (May 17, 2008), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/may/17/topstories3.russia
(noting that the attacks in some instances appeared to originate from IP addresses belonging to Russian
government).
161. Scott J. Shackelford, From Nuclear War to Net War: Analogizing Cyber Attacks in International Law, 27
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 192, 193–94 (2009).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Schmitt, Cyber Operations, supra note 146, at 157.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Traynor, supra note 160.
169. See TIKK, supra note 159, at 23.
170. See Schmitt, Normative Framework, supra note 145, at 915 n.81 (discussing “responsibility” as one
criterion in the Schmitt Analysis).
171. See Schmitt, Cyber Operations, supra note 146, at 156–57 (noting that the attacks “arguably reached the
use of force threshold”); TIKK, supra note 159, at 25 (noting that, in the wake of the attacks, “[p]arallels to
conventional warfare and terrorism were drawn”); Eneken Tikk, Global Cybersecurity — Thinking About the
Niche for NATO, 30 SAIS REVIEW OF INT’L AFFAIRS 105, 114 (2010) (“[T]he 2007 Estonian incidents can be seen
as beyond the threshold of an ‘average’ cyber crime….”); Mark Landler & John Markoff, After Computer Siege
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majority of the seven-prongs would have been met.172 Due to the rising frequency
and severity of cyber operations, a future trend may presumptively regard similar
cyberattacks as being a use of force, with evolving practice as being the force to
“clarify the norm and its attendant threshold.”173 Had an alternative scenario
occurred, whereby the only entities attacked in Estonia were strictly private
organizations (and who had suffered attacks rising to the level of a use of force
under the Schmitt Analysis), it behooves policy makers and victim corporations to
consider how to assess the effects of their attack and their available recourse.
4. Cyber Operations as an “Armed Attack”
Similar to Article 2(4), so too Article 51 of the U.N. Charter was drafted before the
advent of the Internet.174 Article 51, establishing that an aggrieved State may resort
to an individual or collective use of force in response to being the victim of an
“armed attack,”175 remains the central feature of jus ad bellum, and has been
previously applied to non-kinetic challenges posed by biological and chemical
warfare.176 Likewise, Article 51 can be instructive for determining when a cyber
operation amounts to an armed attack, and three approaches have been recognized
to deal with this application: an effects-based approach, a target-based approach,
and an instrument-based approach.177

in Estonia, War Fears Turn to Cyberspace, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2007, at A1 (noting that Estonia’s defense
minister called the attacks a “national security situation”); cf. Ulf Haeussler, Cyber Security and Defense from the
Perspective of Articles 4 and 5 of the NATO Treaty, in INTERNATIONAL CYBER SECURITY LEGAL & POLICY
PROCEEDINGS 105 (Eneken Tikk & Anna-Maria Taliharm eds., CCD COE Publications 2010) (discussing the
Estonian cyberattacks in the context of thresholds for NATO action and analogizing NATO thresholds to U.N.
thresholds).
172. See Schmitt, Normative Framework, supra note 145, at 914–15 (listing the prongs of the Schmitt
Analysis).
173. Schmitt, Cyber Operations, supra note 146, at 157.
174. Articles 2(4) and 51 of the United Nations Charter were enacted in 1945. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para.
4 (discussing how U.N. members should retain in their use of force against other territories); see also U.N.
Charter art. 51 (articulating that a state may act in self-defense to an armed attack against it). While the
precursor to the Internet was discovered in 1965 when a computer in Massachusetts was connected to a
computer in California over a telephone line – twenty years after Articles 2(4) and 51 of the United Nations
charter were enacted. See Barry M. Leiner et al., Brief History of the Internet, INTERNET SOCIETY,
http://www.internetsociety.org/internet/internet-51/history-internet/brief-history-internet#Origins (last visited
Nov. 1, 2012) (noting that the Internet can be traced only to the 1960s).
175. U.N. Charter art. 51.
176. See Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45 (providing that a signatory may request
assistance from other signatories to respond to the use of chemical weapons against it). But see Davis Brown, A
Proposal for an International Convention to Regulate the Use of Information Systems in Armed Conflict, 47 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 179, 179–80 (arguing that states have struggled in their attempt to promulgate rules of engagement in
a timely manner when faced with advancements in warfare techniques and weaponry).
177. U.N. Charter art. 51; Hollis, supra note 154, at 1041; see TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 137, at 19 (the
International Group of Experts behind the Tallinn Manual unanimously believed that jus ad bellum applied to
cyber operations).
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The predominant approach for assessing when a use of force in the cyber context
crosses the threshold of an armed attack is an effects-based approach, premised on
the idea that cyber warfare produces effects that can equate to kinetic force, namely
the effects of death and destruction that flow from cyberattacks.178 This view focuses
on the consequences that result in the aftermath. Under the effects-based approach,
a cyber operation is an armed attack if it either (i) causes actual physical damage or
injury to persons,179 or (ii) was specifically intended to cause physical damage or
injury to persons.180
This approach to cyberattack is the most akin to traditional jus ad bellum
regarding nontraditional kinetic warfare, and currently remains the favored
approach by a number of states, including the United States, and even Russia, along
with inter-governmental organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO).181 However, this emerging consensus is called into question,
as some detractors object to a proposed normative framework based on Article 51
altogether. Critics to this effects-based approach find a daunting translational
problem in applying existing international law to cyberattacks, largely because cyber
operations represent an entirely different dynamic than traditional military
operations, exhibiting everything from a diverse set of objectives in their usage (e.g.,
cyber hacking pranks and social protest) and varied results (e.g., cyber crimes of
identity theft or harmless practical jokes) than traditional military operations.182
However, even the most critical of objectors recognize the current framework of jus
ad bellum will remain, at least until state practice and opinio juris would suggest
otherwise.183 Thus, the effects-based approach still stands as a robust approach for
determining armed-attack.

178. Schmitt, Normative Framework, supra note 145, at 913 (“Armed coercion is not defined by whether or
not kinetic energy is employed or released, but rather by the nature of the direct results caused, specifically
physical damage and human injury.”); see Hollis, supra note 154, at 1041–42.
179. Schmitt, Normative Framework, supra note 145, at 934; Yoram Dinstein, Computer Network Attacks and
Self-Defense, 76 INT’L L. STUD. SER. U.S. NAVAL WAR COL. 99, 100 (2002).
180. Schmitt, Normative Framework, supra note 145, at 913.
181. COMM. ON OFFENSIVE INFO. WARFARE, supra note 10, at 251–52 (citing Schmitt, Normative Framework,
supra note 145, at 913) (recognizing that cyberattack assessment should be an effects-based analysis); Barkham,
supra note 139, at 79 (same); DEP’T OF DEF., OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, AN ASSESSMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ISSUES IN INFORMATION OPERATIONS 8 (2d ed. 1999) (detailing effects of cyberattacks that may constitute
armed conflict); KARL RAUSSCHER & ANDREY KOROTKOV, THE RUSSIA-U.S. BILATERAL ON CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT: WORKING TOWARDS RULES FOR GOVERNING CYBER CONFLICT RENDERING THE
GENEVA AND HAGUE CONVENTIONS IN CYBERSPACE 25 (EastWest Institute 2011), available at
http://www.ewi.info/working-towards-rules-governing-cyber-conflict (in introducing joint recommendations
from Russian and American government and private sector officials, noting that a cyberattack that causes
damage could be considered warfare); see also BROWNLIE, supra note 127, at 265–69 (discussing a resultsoriented approach to the law of war); Haeussler, supra note 171, at 115, 120–21 (discussing an effects-based
approach before urging revisiting the prohibition of the use of force in the cyber context); TALLINN MANUAL,
supra note 137, at 19.
182. See Hollis, supra note 154, at 1040–42.
183. Id. at 1040–42.
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It is possible to envision the applicability of the effects-based analysis in the
private sector when dealing with certain critical infrastructure operators, such as
power plants, hospitals, or water treatment plants. In these situations, theoretically
a framework could be proposed whereby the company or its regulatory authority
would have a means to establish physical damage in fact or that life or limb were
lost, and thus invoke the right to self-defense. In these cases, the critical
infrastructure that would affect the “right” effects because they are inherently the
sorts that could cause physical damages, versus simply virtual, economic, or social;
however, to exhibit the kind of effects that could take down networks in life-critical
industries, the situations are few and far between.
The reality is that most private sector entities would not exhibit the “right
effects” (i.e., physical damage or death), even if they were considered industries
184
operating as critical infrastructure (e.g., banking or information technology). The
fact that their effects are not of the right kind, should not preclude them from
trying to protect themselves; certainly, substantial economic harm can be
debilitating on a wide-scale, as evidenced by the Global Recession of 2008.185 It is
imperative for policy makers to take a nuanced and flexible approach, albeit still
based on the foundations of the various jus ad bellum theories, enabling private
companies to have adequate methods of recourse, when they are substantially
disrupted or disabled. This requires policy makers, as this paper will attempt to
prove, to envision the other critical aspects of a company which are (a) affected in
ways manifestly different from simply physical effects (e.g., to prevent a population
from accessing bank accounts online); and (b) likely to the target of attack against a
private organization (e.g., stealing trade secrets as part of corporate espionage) —
186
both of which are evolving technological and cultural notions.

V. Adequate Attribution for Active Defense
Attribution in the cyber context is defined as being “the identity or location of an
attacker or an attacker’s intermediary.”187 Attributing cyber operations is a critical
determination in the assessment of the types of recourse a victim network operator
has available to respond to an attack. As Hunker et al. have described, “[o]ur legal
and policy frameworks for responding to cyberattacks cannot work unless we have
adequate attribution; these frameworks remain incomplete because we lack the

184. See Schmitt, Cyber Operations, supra note 146, at 163 (noting that the “essence” of an armed attack is
the causation or risk of death, injury, or tangible damage).
185. PHILLIP SWAGEL, THE COST OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: THE IMPACT OF THE SEPTEMBER 2008 ECONOMIC
COLLAPSE 15 (Pew Fin. Reform Project, Briefing Paper No. 18, 2009), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/
uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Economic_Mobility/Cost-of-the-Crisis-final.pdf
(finding
that
American families’ lost $3.4 trillion form the values of their homes between July 2008 and March 2009 and the
value of their stocks fell by $7.4 trillion over the same period).
186. See infra Part V.A.
187. HUNKER, supra note 26, at 5.
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basis (sufficient attribution) to actually use them.”188 Such adequate attribution
would be beneficial in three primary ways: (i) improving deterrence if there is a
prospect that an attacker can be identified, (ii) strengthening security postures with
defensive measures against identified sources, and (iii) promoting the active defense
of networks to interrupt and neutralize incoming attacks.189
Various theories exist about how to determine the source of a cyberattack. For
example, a technical approach can focus on the specific technical characteristics of
the attack mechanism, such as identifying portions of attack code or programming
techniques.190 A list of nine technical approaches is summarized in Figure 1. Despite
the fact that a technical approach helps to provide a framework for collecting digital
forensics, it is widely held that even perfect technical proof is an inadequate
measure for assigning responsibility to a cyberattack.191 This is largely because of the
ability of hackers to develop methods to overlay or confuse channels and the
prevalence of IP spoofing.192
Figure 1: Some Current Technical Approaches to Attribution193
Technique
Hash based IP traceback

Ingress filtering

Internet Control Message Protocol
(ICMP) return to sender

Overlay network for IP traceback

Description
Routers store a hash (relatively unique,
compressed representation created by a
one-way function) of each packet across the
network; attribution is done by tracing
back the hash across network routers
Require that all messages entering a
network have a source address in a valid
range for that network entry point. This
limits the range of possible attack sources.
Reject all packets destined for the victim;
return rejected packets to their senders
(e.g., “destination unreachable” error
message packet is sent back to the source IP
address listed in the rejected packets).
An overlay network links all ISP edge

188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Irving Lachow, The Stuxnet Enigma: Implications for the Future of Cybersecurity, 11 GEO.J. INT’L AFF.
(SPECIAL ISSUE) 118, 119 (2011).
191. HUNKER, supra note 26, at 10–11.
192. See id. at 16–17 (discussing that technical approaches to attribution can be circumvented by spoofing
— i.e., a user hiding his identity — and that it cannot be practically stopped).
193. This table has been reproduced in its entirety from id. at 16.
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routers to a central tracking router; hopby-hop approaches are used to find the
source; especially useful for large packet
flows associated with DDOS attacks.
Generating trace packets using Periodically (e.g., 1 in 20,000 packets) a
control messages (e.g., iTrace)
router sends an ICMP traceback message to
the same destination address as the sample
packet. The destination (or designated
monitor) collects and correlates the
tracking information.
Probabilistic packet marking
A router randomly determines whether it
should embed information about the
message’s route into a given message. The
defender can then use a set of messages to
determine the route.
Hackback/countermeasure
Insert querying functionality into a host,
specifically without the permission of the
owner. If an attacker controls the host, this
may alert the attacker and make the
information less reliable.
Honeypots
Decoy systems that are only accessed by
attackers
capture
information
for
attribution.
Watermarking
A passive technique that brands a file as
belonging to a rightful owner.
Taking a more operational approach, one could observe the “tactics, techniques,
and procedures (TTPs)” of the adversary.194 In contrast to either a technical or
operational approach, a focus on the “strategic context surrounding the event”
could be employed.195 Dmitri Alpertrov, a notable security expert, has posited that:
The threshold is not proof beyond reasonable doubt in the court of law but
sufficient mix of suspicion and evidence to justify the retaliatory strike to the
plurality of domestic and international audiences. For instance, strategic

194.
195.

30

Lachow, supra note 190, at 119.
Id.

Journal of Business & Technology Law

Shane McGee, Randy V. Sabett, & Anand Shah
context of international relations at the time at which a cyber attack may
take place can offer strong clues as to its origins.196
Regardless of the approach used, the ultimate goal is to adequately identify the
adversary so that a response can be deployed.
A. Framework for ‘Good Enough’ Attribution: A Roadmap
Defining “good enough” or adequate attribution as it pertains to our discussion of
private-actors requires a framework that incorporates commonly practiced
cyberattack analysis and threat assessments. Additionally, there must be a
bifurcation of international versus domestic attacks, and different legal, strategic,
and tactical considerations when dealing with a private actor that may be
government-backed (e.g., government contractors). Contending with the technical
and political realities requires that applicable standards are flexible and not so rigid
as to be impractical or abused.
To this end, applying traditional standards of proof — the evidentiary levels
required in U.S. criminal and civil jurisprudence — would be unwise. As U.S. Air
Force Lt. Col. Forrest Hare recently attested to at an international conference,
attribution represents more of a political concept rather than legal.197 He warns that
the traditional standards of proof — i.e., beyond a reasonable doubt, clear and
compelling, and preponderance of the evidence — are inapplicable in cyber
operations, let alone most military or intelligence activities.198 Nonetheless, Bret
Michael, a professor at the U.S. Naval Post-Graduate School, contends that the
challenges of attributing the source of an attack can be overcome by weaving what
he terms, “a clear mosaic of responsibility.”199As such, Michael believes that
showings of who provided monetary funding or material technical instruction may
be adequate.200 In light of the state of the cyber world, both in a nation-state and
private-context, we find Michael’s assessment as highly instructive.
The goal of our “good enough” standard will, therefore, be premised upon
trying to paint a “mosaic of responsibility,” based upon the multitude of factors
(e.g., political, economic, social, technical, etc.) that reasonably point to the source
of an attack. While it has been duly noted that the concept of “spoofing,” is
regarded by security experts as being more of a rule than an exception;201 the basic
196. DMITRI ALPEROVITCH, TOWARDS ESTABLISHMENT OF CYBERSPACE DETERRENCE STRATEGY 91 (C.
Czosseck et al. eds., CCD COE Publications 2011) (citing Eric Sterner, Retaliatory Deterrence in Cyberspace, 5
STRATEGIC STUDIES QUARTERLY 62, 71, 73 (2011)).
197. Jones, supra note 40.
198. See, e.g., id.
199. Id.
200. Jones, supra note 40.
201. Sharon Nelson & John Simek, Smoke and Mirrors: Fabrication and Alteration of Electronic Evidence,
LAW PRACTICE, Mar. 2007, at 22–23 (discussing the practice and prevalence of email spoofing).
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premise in building a prima facie case against an aggressor, and thus, justification
for employing active defense, remains that the “good enough” standard allows for a
rebuttable presumption against an alleged aggressor. The burden of proof for the
prima facie case for employing active defense measures lies with the victimplaintiff’s rendition of a responsibility mosaic; whereas the rebuttal or any other
complete or partial defense must be reasonably established by an alleged attackerdefendant.202
The framework envisioned considers the grave danger that inaction presents to
private organizations, while also pairing together the advances in attribution
technology, the risks presented of a misattributed counterstrike, and the overall
interests of the principal stakeholders (i.e., the victim, the alleged attacker, nationstate interests, and users of the Internet, at large). The explanation of the
framework will first begin by applying a “good enough” standard in a domestic
context, as between domestic companies and according to common law civil and
criminal jurisprudence.203 Second, the international context will be explored as
between purely private organizations located in different countries, in light of
prevailing international law standards.204 Third, another dynamic will be explored as
between private organizations located in different countries, but where one or both
of the actors are either funded or in some form commissioned by a nation-state
actor.205 Naturally, this will invite a discussion of the applicability of the Laws of
Armed Conflict.206 An examination of these different scenarios and legal issues will
reveal a roadmap that both companies and governments can use in assessing
whether to engage in active defense and the policy recommendations to be crafted
for resolving private-sector cyber conflicts. Ultimately, the “good enough” standard
will enable attribution to adequately ascertain the identity of an attack source —
promoting systemic cyber deterrence — while still being able to serve as a limiting
principle for justifying active defense only when appropriate — preventing the
unnecessary escalation of cyber aggression.
1. Domestic Private-Sector Attacks
The contours of an entirely domestic conflict require that one non-governmental
organization (the “aggressor-company”), based in Country A, takes action against
another non-governmental organization (the “victim-company”) in Country A,
using only commercial cyber infrastructure, means, and engineering to launch the
202. Compare Schmitt, Cyber Operations, supra note 146, at 169 (discussing that a state acting in self-defense
bears the burden of proof), and Jones, supra note 40 (discussing that a state may collect sources to meet its
burden of proof), with Schmitt, Cyber Operations, supra note 146, at 169 (stating that a state acting in
anticipation of an attack also bears a burden of proof).
203. See infra Parts V.A.1–3.
204. See infra Part V.A.4.
205. See infra Part V.A.5.
206. See infra Part V.A.5.
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attacks. This model presupposes that the purpose for engaging in such attacks is
limited either (i) to facilitate the acquisition or espionage of corporate intellectual
property (IP), sensitive information, or other physical corporate assets — acts
which could be actionable under civil tort liability or per se illegal under criminal
statutes; or (ii) to damage, disrupt, or neutralize corporate IP, sensitive
information, or other physical corporate assets — implying criminality, either per
se under Country A’s criminal statutes or common law crime where mens rea
(specific or general) is established, along with the potential for civil tort liability. In
either case, the normative framework requires that there be an attack made to serve
primarily economic ends — e.g., to diminish or dilute victim-company’s
competitive edge, and in turn improve or maintain aggressor-company’s footing.
Additionally, assumptions need to be drawn for analogizing between physical
and the Internet world. Torts and crimes against one’s property do not allow for
any self-help, physical self-defense measures to be taken, except in narrower
circumstances for when there is “hot pursuit,” as against an alleged tortfeasor or
207
criminal assailant. Where torts and crimes are committed against a person, selfdefense measures are allowed against the attacker.208 For instance, under common
law assault, self-defense is allowed by a victim or third party when there is a
reasonable apprehension of immediate harm against the victim’s person or another
person.209
2. Attacking the Victim-Company’s Property
Cyberattacks of a primarily economic motivation, would be mostly considered as
either a tort or crime against a company’s property, thereby restricting the ability to
pursue any active defense-counter measure except for alerting legal authorities to
help them, unless there is arguably a “hot pursuit” against the aggressor.210 While
immediacy is an important factor in weighing whether “hot pursuit” to retake
physical stolen property, perhaps the standard may be relaxed or redefined as to
cyber detections and intrusions, which may occur simultaneously in real-time if a
victim-company monitors leaked information being stolen or potentially after some
reasonable amount of time after-the-fact that a victim-company realizes that
207. Adam B. Badawi, Self-Help and the Rules of Engagement, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 30–33 (2012) (self-help);
Gregory A. Diamond, Note, To Have but Not to Hold: Can “Resistance Against Kidnapping” Justify Lethal SelfDefense Against Incapacitated Batterers?, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 729, 749 n.109 (2002) (citing 2 Paul Robinson,
Criminal Law Defenses § 131(c)(1), at 78 (1984)) (theft and hot pursuit).
208. Crawford v. State, 190 A.2d 538, 541 (Md. 1963) (citing State v. Middleham, 170 N.W. 446 (Iowa
1883); State v. Patterson, 45 Vt. 308 (1873); People v. Coughlin, 35 N.W. 72 (Mich. 1887)) (discussing the
generally accepted rule that man has a right to self-defense).
209. Crawford, 190 A.2d at 541 (citing OSCAR L. WARREN, WARREN ON HOMICIDE 805–06 (1938); Homicide
or Assault in Defense of Habitation or Property, 25 A.L.R. 508 (1923), People v. Osborne, 115 N.E. 890 (Ill. 1917);
Carroll v. State, 23 Ala. 28, 36 (1853); Parrish v. Commonwealth, 81 Va. 1 (1884), People v. Tomlins, 107 N.E.
496 (N.Y. 1914); Pond v. People, 8 Mich. 150 (1860)).
210. See supra Part V.A.1.
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company assets have been stolen.211 Nonetheless, this context is one that would be
guided by familiar duty, breach, causation (actual and proximate), and harm
jurisprudence.212 Because active defense would only be justified in “hot pursuit,” it
will be the only attention given as per strictly stolen corporate assets.
3. Attacking the Victim-Company’s “Person”
The more difficult issue to grapple with is when dealing with primarily criminal
acts, intended to damage or substantially injure a victim’s person or third party,
and the justification for self-defense in such context in the corporate, cyber-realm.
Here the analogy of corporate cyber infrastructure damage requires that we define
the “personhood” of a corporate entity, such that a victim company could respond
back with active defense countermeasures.213 Instructive to such a conversation,
wherein graver dangers are involved with corporate assets, is the concept of a
country’s critical infrastructure.214 Just as an attack against a country’s critical
infrastructure (i.e., where it threatened the stability and physical safety of a
country’s citizens) would likely enable a countermeasure to be deployed by a
country, here too a company’s core corporate assets, which give it economic
viability, could be defined as its own critical infrastructure, which if purposefully
attacked, could justify a countermeasure — i.e., placing into jeopardy a company’s
“personhood.”
Defining the specific parameters of what would be included as vital corporate
assets or critical corporate infrastructure is the topic of future inquires, but at least
for purposes of our framework they represent graver forms of attack beyond
corporate espionage, which seek to damage the lifeblood of a corporation, and
thereby could allow for a proportional countermeasure, self-help.215 Although
critical corporate assets may include possessions directly or indirectly related to the
preservation of physical life and limb (e.g., a formula for an important medicine or
code to run a power facility for a hospital), they might also include assets that
substantially endanger the company’s competitiveness (e.g., someone stealing or

211. Compare Andrea Shalal-Esa, Decision on Expanding Cyber Defense Pilot Due in March, REUTERS, Jan. 13,
2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/14/us-cyber-defense-idUSTRE80D02L20120114
(discussing Lockheed Martin Corp.’s recent success in detecting and thwarting a virus), with Justin Balthrop et
al., Technological Networks and the Spread of Computer Viruses, 304 SCIENCE, 527, 527–28 (2004) (discussing the
effects of viruses that were not immediately detected, notably that the Sobig virus alone caused over $30 billion
in damages).
212. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (2005).
213. See Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 189 (1888) (stating
that there is no doubt that a private corporation is included under the designation of “person”).
214. RAUSSCHER & KOROTKOV, supra note 181, at 11–12.
215. See Hathaway, supra note 160, at 824–30 (differentiating cyberattacks from cyber espionage).
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manipulating the Coca-Cola formula) to the point where it may spell a
corporation’s demise.216
a. First-Prong: Assessing the Attack and Determining the Attack Source
Irrespective of the criminal or tort charge, the proposed framework for adequate
attribution in the event of recourse is the same. The first prong of analysis requires
both an intensive investigation of the attack source and a determination of whether
there was a substantial harm caused by the attack and an understanding of the
nature of the attack.217 This requires collecting digital forensics at a technical level to
determine how an attack took place, and to define the target of the theft or
damage.218 Understanding the nature of the attack is a key step for a victim
company, insofar as it determines the severity of the attack employed and clues as
to the intent of the cyber weapon that was employed by an aggressor-company.
However, the harm may not be limited to the actual taking or destruction of a vital
corporate asset, but may also include the economic or physical effects that might be
the foreseeable consequence as well. Once these factors and the sophistication and
intent of the cyber weapon used against it have been assessed, it will be the task of
the victim-company’s operators to determine the source.
In light of painting a “mosaic of responsibility” in this scenario, a technical
approach to identifying the source of the attack must include analysis of both the
motive of potential corporate competitors and the strategic context for why an
attack was triggered in the first place. Herein, the market landscape of industries
plays an important role in the determination of attribution. While it is entirely
possible that non-economic forces (e.g., reckless hackers) were at work to bring
down a victim’s company’s viability, the probability of such an occurrence needs to
219
be balanced with the probable intent and sophistication involved in the attack. If
evidence of an attack source is too mixed and intent indeterminable, then a “good
enough” threshold has certainly not been reached and discussion of active defense
should be tabled. If, however, evidence can reveal strong indicators of a source, as

216. See generally Kenneth M. Siegel, Protecting the Most Valuable Corporate Asset: Electronic Data, Identity
Theft, Personal Information, and the Role of Data Security in the Information Age, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 779
(2007) (arguing that since technology changes have shifted many aspects of a business from a brick and mortar
operation onto the Internet, information is a company’s most important asset).
217. See infra Parts VI.B.2, IV.B, V for reasons why attribution and determination of harm take primary
importance.
218. For commentary in broad agreement with this point, see Kesan & Hayes, Thinking Through, supra note
66, at 330–33.
219. See David P. Leonard, Character and Motive in Evidence Law, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 439, 469 (2001)
(discussing motive and reaction in general by stating, “[a] person who has a motive to act is somewhat more
likely to have acted than is a person without a motive”); Press Release, Kaspersky Lab, Kaspersky Lab Provides
Its Insights on Stuxnet Worm (Sept. 24, 2010), http://www.kaspersky.com/about/news/virus/2010/Kaspersky_
Lab_provides_its_insights_on_Stuxnet_worm (arguing — prior to later reporting that would clarify the matter
— that the worm’s sophistication alone helped to indicate that it had a very specific target).
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used against a vital corporate asset or where there is a “hot pursuit” scenario of
stolen property, then the second prong of inquiry needs to be considered in terms
of the type of countermeasure allowed, along with an assessment of the risks and
consequences of their use.
b. Second-Prong: Justifying a Counterattack and Interest-Based Analysis
The second prong of the inquiry addresses the other goal of attribution, which is to
establish a limiting principle of whether active defense is at all advisable. Assuming,
again, that a non-governmental actor is suspected with a strong degree of
confidence under the first prong, the analysis of whether to strike back needs to
weigh several factors before a counterstrike is made: the ability to make a
proportional counterattack, the interests at stake for (i) the victim-company in
striking back, (ii) striking back at the alleged aggressor-company, and (iii) the risk
level posed by wrongly attributing the strike as against an innocent third party
(“innocent-company”) or the strain it places on the overall users of the Internet
(i.e., system wide effects). Under the totality of the circumstances in this interestbased analysis, if a majority of the factors weighs in favor of a countermeasure, then
a victim-company can utilize active defense; if not, then the victim-company must
pursue other mechanisms to resolve the issue, including a call to authorities, a
lawsuit, or its own corporate diplomacy with its adversaries (i.e., their competitors).
i. Victim-Company Interests
Realizing the substantial nuance involved, in light of ambiguous forensic data or the
likely red-herrings of would-be competitors, the balance of interests requires
considerable attention. For the interests of the victim-company to allow a
countermeasure to be carried out, the corporate asset stolen or damaged would,
again, have to be something of critical value to that company (i.e., viewed
holistically to include its employees, shareholders, and customers). The victimcompany would also need to determine if its interests would be best served by
striking back in the first place — a commonsensical restraint — revealing whether
it truly had confidence in its own cyber armory to attack back effectively and
whether it would achieve an efficacious result to either retake stolen or prevent the
(further) damage of stolen corporate assets. Cost and time assessments of
attribution analysis or forensic data would also help determine whether countering
back makes rational business sense.
ii. Aggressor-Company Interests
In regards to the interests of the alleged aggressor-company, a victim-company
must determine whether the value of a countermeasure would send the message of
deterrence or desistence to the original attacker. Such interest would also include an

36

Journal of Business & Technology Law

Shane McGee, Randy V. Sabett, & Anand Shah
assessment for the market damage that would be caused if a rival were impugned,
and the damage it could serve to consumers, overall, when more than one member
of an industry is now weakened (e.g., Coca-Cola hacking back at Pepsi to the point
where both are unable to serve a thirsty populace). Additionally, interests would
need to account for whether an aggressor-company could itself attribute the victimcompany’s counterattack, and the cost-benefit of risking further escalation of a
protracted cyber conflict (i.e., going back and forth).220
iii. Innocent-Company Interests
Acknowledging the fact that imperfect certainty will guide attribution decisions, the
second prong of the framework requires a serious consideration of the risks, costs,
and disruption caused by a countermeasure attack.221 Naturally, the equation of an
innocent-company’s involvement in a cyber conflict, represents a grave reality of
active defense; however, when approached with the same level of diligence and
reasonable apprehension, vis-à-vis, a “mosaic of responsibility,” as represented in
the first-prong, risks will be minimized to the furthest extent possible. One policy
recommendation is that a system of carrying cyber insurance may help alleviate the
pressures and worries of misattributed countermeasure activities, helping to make
whole innocent-company victims or to repair collateral damage caused by a
countermeasure. Such coverage may spark and incentivize victim-companies to
make optimal decisions, lest they face steep rises in their coverage premiums.
Discrete effects upon third-party Internet users may also be taken into account,
where possible, if a countermeasure serves to overwhelm their use of the overall
cyber infrastructure as part of their daily activities, i.e., spillover effects that
foreseeably disrupt both other innocent-companies and Internet users. Again, the
specific penalties or monies to be paid are not the topic of this paper, but simply
can be used as guidance.
If an assessment of the second prong weighs in favor of the victim-company’s
interests, then a company will have established a prima facie justification under the
adequate attribution standard to carry through with an active defense operation.
This is an important feature of this framework as a signal not only of a wellreasoned technical decision by the victim-company, but also one that has a legal
justification if ever brought to court. More importantly, it is an element that makes
sense if demanded by a victim-company’s shareholders. All things considered, our
normative framework is much more of a caution against the use of indiscriminate
active defense than it is a boon for its proliferation.

220. Michael Schmitt, Classification of Cyber Conflict, 17 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 245, 258 (2012) (describing a
protracted conflict as a certain level of intensity and continuity, as opposed to sporadic or isolated incidents).
221. See Kesan & Hayes, Mitigative Counterstriking, supra note 28, at 477–79, 532–33 (describing a few of
the risks associated with counterstrikes).
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4. Private International Attacks
The next area of inquiry expands the normative framework beyond the confines of
a single jurisdiction to highlight the legal and policy implications at work in a
strictly private international context. Here, a conflict requires that one nongovernmental organization (the “aggressor-company”), based in Country A, takes
action against another non-governmental organization (the “victim-company”)
based in Country B, using only commercial cyber infrastructure, means, and
engineering to launch the attacks. As in the domestic context,222 the model assumes
the reason for such an attack in a purely private conflict is primarily economic
either: (i) to facilitate the acquisition or espionage of foreign corporate intellectual
property (IP), sensitive information, or other physical corporate assets —
actionable under civil tort liability or per se illegal under criminal statutes in either
country; or (ii) to damage, disrupt, or neutralize “vital corporate assets,” that would
threaten victim-company’s economic viability — implying criminality, either per se
under Country A and/or Country B’s criminal statutes or common law crime where
a mens rea can be established, in addition to civil liability.
Despite the international setting, our framework in this context is largely the
same as for a purely domestic attack, as has been explained in the detail above, with
two notable additions. Unlike in a domestic conflict, here transmission lines and
data over the Internet will cross jurisdictional lines and may further obscure the
private versus public infrastructure used to launch a cyberattack. Therefore, one of
the critical differences requires that, under the first prong attack and attribution
223
analyses, a victim-company in Country B determine, to its best ability, whether
the attack against it from a foreign aggressor-company in Country A was motivated
by a purely private reason using primarily commercial cyber infrastructure to
launch the attack. Assuming that a rough bifurcation of attack source (i.e., public
vs. private) is technically feasible, a further inquiry would be needed to ensure that
the reason for the attack was not one to perturb national security or materially
affect Country B’s public interests.
Similarly, an interest-based analysis as occurs in the second prong would need to
be expanded to include not only the interests of the victim-company and aggressorcompany, but also the nation-state interests of Country B (i.e., where victimcompany is based), the nation-state interests of Country A (i.e., where aggressorcompany is based, and the nation-state interests of Country C (i.e., where innocentcompany is based). A non-exhaustive list of Country A’s concerns would include
the protection of domestic private organizations (i.e., victim-company), its
enforcement of any domestic legal regimes related to cyberattack, and, specifically,
the regulation of the self-help means used in active defense countermeasures by the

222.
223.
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victim-company. Country B’s concern would certainly include the protection of its
domestic private organizations (i.e., alleged aggressor-company), the enforcement
of domestic cyber laws, along with the need to govern the cyber activities of its
domestic private organizations, such that they do not affect the public interests or
defensive posture of any other country (i.e., Country A or Country C). Country C,
on the other hand, represents the interests of a misattributed cyberattack against an
innocent-company based in its jurisdiction. As such, it is important that Country
C’s interests are weighed to both repair and mitigate the innocent-company’s
damage, as well as in the interest of spurning reckless cyber countermeasures.
Country C’s interests may additionally represent some of the collateral damage
concerns needed to be taken into account when victim-company decides to employ
its active defense.
Thus, a review of the attribution framework begins with the first-prong of
assessing the international attack and determining the possible sources of the
attack. Assuming, as here, that it is of a purely commercial, albeit international, the
critical features will need to do the following: (i) satisfy a severity-effects test, such
that the attack causes substantial harm to a victim-company’s vital corporate assets,
in addition to satisfying a determination that the attack was for purely commercial
ends, affecting primarily commercial interests; and (ii) be based on a context-based
assessment of the attack source, i.e., painting the “mosaic of responsibility,” that
reflects world geo-political, economic, and cultural issues. The second prong of this
framework would again concentrate on justifying a proportionate response based
on the type and severity of the attack made and the confidence of the traceback trail
to a source. However, added to the interest-based analysis, is an emphasis on
weighing the legal implications and interests of the nation-states involved, i.e., of
the victim-company (Country B), the alleged aggressor-company (Country A),
along with those of a misattributed innocent-company (Country C).
Realizing the practical and technical issues of employing such a comprehensive
assessment (and the time-sensitive nature of making a countermeasure
determination), our framework recommends a case-by-case analysis of the salient
issues be used as between the nation-states and companies involved. With respect
to policy considerations, we believe three emerging trends, in particular, will help
guide public-private practice related to active cyber defense and attribution: (i)
domestic-level cyber laws, i.e., the increased role of cyber statutory regimes in
224
different countries; (ii) international-level cyber law, the rise in cyber-related
bilateral/multilateral agreements (e.g., the European Union Convention on
Cybercrime) and rule regimes (e.g., NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of

224. See Marc D. Goodman & Susan W. Brenner, The Emerging Consensus on Criminal Conduct in
Cyberspace, 10 OX. INT’L. J. LAW & INFO. TECH. 139, 189 (2012) (mentioning several different action plans and
organizations developed in Europe to combat cyberattacks).
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Excellence);225 and (iii) the growing practice of using international commercial
arbitration and contractual arrangements to handle disputes between private
companies operating under divergent domestic laws.226
5. Public-Private International Attacks
The third area of the normative framework’s inquiry is perhaps the most
complicated, involving both private and public international actors. The reason for
the complication is primarily due to the dual-use scenario where private companies
are employed or sponsored by nation-states to carry out cyberattacks for nonpurely economic goal, and the resulting maelstrom of trying to parse domestic
jurisprudence with the long-held rules guiding international laws or armed conflict.
Despite the obvious shortcomings of clear, international guidance,227 we believe
there is a suggested path for practitioners and operators to follow, which at the least
will be better than without a viable alternative. Fortunately, the private actors
involved may relax otherwise more rigid parameters as pronounced in traditional
international law as between nation-states. Moreover, a word of caution before
applying this normative framework: The authors do not in any way condone
vigilante cyber actions to cause cyber conflict between nation-states; however, we
wish to acknowledge the growing trend of nation-states contracting with private
organizations to carry out their cyber operations, and the resulting abuse that
comes with rigid standards of assessing “state responsibility.”228
Whereas the previous guiding motivations for cyberattacks in the private
contexts were premised on purely economic gains, here the motivations expand to
consider national-economic interests (i.e., modern mercantilism), political,
cultural, and military strategy.229 Thus, the harm to be inflicted reflects not only on
the concepts of “vital corporate assets,” such as intellectual property, but can also

225. Graham H. Todd, Armed Attack in Cyberspace: Deterring Asymmetric Warfare with an Asymmetric
Definition, 64 A.F. L. REV. 65, 70 (2009); TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 137, at 17.
226. James W. Constable, International Commercial Arbitration, MD. B.J., July/August 2010, at 14.
227. See Hathaway, supra note 160, at 822 (noting that “the law of war regulates only a small subset of
cyber-attacks”).
228. James A. Lewis, Thresholds for Cyberwar, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (Sept.
2010), http://csis.org/publication/thresholds-cyberwar (highlighting nation-states hiring cyber mercenaries to
conduct their operations); see TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 137, at 46 (finding that a ‘use of force’ could be
attributable to a nation-state if it contracted with a third party under the law of State responsibility); SEE U.S.CHINA ECON. & SEC. REV. COMM'N, 2012 REPORT TO CONGRESS 9 (2012), available at http://www.uscc.gov/
annual_report/2012/2012-Report-to-Congress.pdf (reporting that "corporate actors, such as Chinese
information technology or telecommunications firms, may . . . operate in cyberspace on the state’s behalf"); see,
e.g., Stacy Curtin, Michael Chertoff: Cyberattacks Are The Biggest Risk Facing America, DAILY TICKER (May 4,
2012, 12:58 PM), http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/daily-ticker/michael-chertoff-cyberattacks-biggest-riskfacing-america-165803529.html (stating that, in carrying out cyberattacks, “many nations . . . use their
intelligence agencies as a way to enable their companies . . . to compete in the marketplace”).
229. See, e.g., Gorman, supra note 50 (attributing theft of sensitive information on the F-35 fighter jet to
China); Leppard, supra note 50 (indicating British intelligence confirmation of Chinese involvement).
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include matters pertaining to military maneuvering, along with objective and
subjective notions of a nation-state’s “critical infrastructure,” commonly comprised
of supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems over power supplies,
facilities vital for the sustenance of a population, and the banking system.230 Besides,
the elevation of harm and public interests involved, the stakes become ever higher
as self-defense as allowed by jurisprudence, must adapt a standard at least
comprehendible to the U.N. Charter and traditional jus ad bellum.
As mentioned previously in the background regarding jus ad bellum, this
becomes increasingly difficult to accomplish when conflicting views on what brings
a cyberattack to the level of an “armed attack,” given little practical guidance.231 We
propose instead, a non-exclusive “hybrid approach,” combining each of the three
prevailing views (i.e., “effects-based,” “target-based,” and “instrument-based”) to
arrive at how substantial a cyberattack used by or against a nation-state could be.
Considering the relative strengths of these analytical frameworks, none of these, let
alone the widely-accepted, effects-based approach of the Schmitt Analysis, can be
disregarded. Rather, an effort utilizing a hybrid approach, taking the best from
each, does seem workable. This is because none of the approaches actually sets out
232
to be mutually exclusive of the other, and so combining them does not frustrate
the purpose or the realities of jus ad bellum as observed in each of them. This
feature of inclusiveness, despite divergent viewpoints on the meaning and
interpretation of Article 51,233 highlights the ability for each to be combined in a
framework together and the validity of a hybrid approach, at least as it pertains to
evaluate attribution concerns, and whether a counter cyberattack using active
defenses would be allowed.
Under the hybrid approach, any technical operator of a victim-company or
victim-country (e.g., CSO/CIO in a private context; U.S. Cyber Command
(CYBERCOM)234 in a public context) would determine if they suffered an “armed
attack” if: first, the attack used rose to the level of a use of force under the Schmitt
Analysis for its effects;235 second, if the attack both damaged or substantially
230. See Spencer Kelly, Hackers Outwit Online Banking Identity Security Systems, BBC NEWS (10 Feb. 2012,
12:54 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-16812064 (detailing threats to banks); David E. Sanger,
Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2012, at A1 (describing an attack
on SCADA systems).
231. See Hathaway, supra note 160, at 845 (noting the three different approaches to determining when a
cyberattack becomes an armed attack).
232. Id. at 845, 848 (giving no indication that the three approaches are mutually exclusive).
233. TOM RUYS, ‘ARMED ATTACK’ AND ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER: EVOLUTIONS IN CUSTOMARY LAW
AND PRACTICE 58 (2010).
234. Jeremy Hsu, U.S. Cyber Command Now Fully Online, and Seeking a Few Good Geeks, POPSCI (Oct. 10,
2009, 2:29 PM), http://www.popsci.com/military-aviation-amp-space/article/2009-10/us-cyber-commandnow-online-and-seeking-few-good-geeks (describing the purposes and functions of CYBERCOM); U.S. Cyber
Command, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND, http://www.stratcom.mil/factsheets/Cyber_Command/ (last updated
Dec. 2011).
235. See supra Part IV.B.2.
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disrupted a victim-country’s critical national infrastructure and a victim-company’s
“vital corporate assets”;236 and third, analogize to the functional characteristics of
the cyber weapon employed to surmise if its intended use were to cause the
resulting harm (e.g., Stuxnet causing turbines to spin out of control).237 While the
hybrid approach is not without flaws, it presents a manner of approach to the
subject, and can help initiate a public-private dialog to inspect how to steer a
consequence of attack-value for attribution-sake. Additionally, the hybrid approach
allows a counter response; self-help measures to be used where there is something
less substantial (i.e., not death or physical destruction) than a traditional “armed
attack” but where there is an indication of a coordinated attack taken against
certain public-private cyber infrastructure of a victim-company and/or victim238
country that suggests that it wants to cause national security disruptions.
Setting up the parameters as we did in the other examples, here again we have
victim-company, based in Country B, who is attacked by the aggressor-company,
in Country A, with the authorization or support (e.g., technical know-how and/or
monetary funding) of Country A, with the intent to damage or substantially
disrupt some public interest (i.e., military, economic, political, or cultural) of
Country B, as it may be manifest or reflected in victim-company. For instance, if
the Chinese government contracted with a private company to take action against
the U.S.’s Lockheed Martin to manipulate or prevent the aerospace design and
production specifications, it could provide China with an important military and
economic advantage.
Given the public-private nuance, additional criteria to the aforementioned
framework would need to be added: the first prong would establish (i) whether a
cyberattack rose to the level of an “armed attack” under the hybrid approach and
(ii) whether there was a strong indication of the attack source, i.e., painting the
“mosaic of responsibility” against an aggressor-company and aggressor-country;
the second prong would also include (i) a justification for using active defense
against an alleged aggressor-company and aggressor-country, balanced against (ii)
the interest-based analysis of the important stakeholders, including those of each of
the host company countries, along with any innocent-company and/or innocentcountry.
Applying the hybrid approach to the analysis: if (i) an attack against a victimcompany and/or victim-country has substantial consequences (as measured under a
Schmitt Analysis or similar test); (ii) targeted against a company’s vital corporate
assets and a nation-state’s critical infrastructure; (iii) by an cyberattack ‘weapon’
236. See supra Part V.A.4.
237. See supra Part III.B.
238. See, e.g., Harold K. Koh, Legal Advisor to the U.S. State Dept., Remarks at US CYBERCOM InterAgency Legal Conference (Sept. 18, 2012), http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/197924.htm [hereinafter
Koh Remarks] (arguing that the right of self-defense applies to cyberattack as between nation-states and where
private actors act upon the State’s instructions or under its direction or control).
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that was created/used with that specific intent, then the victim-company in
conjunction with a victim-country can rightfully respond back with a proportional
counterattack. However, attribution serves as a limiting factor; thus victimcompanies must (iv) assess both the confidence of their evidence painting a mosaic
of responsibility, and the interests served in a counterattack, as to themselves, as
against the aggressor-company and aggressor-country, and any possible
considerations for an innocent-company or innocent-country. If in the event that
traceback and the “mosaic of responsibility” reveal that a nation-state was indeed
involved, we recommend that information-sharing with a third-party international
operator or an appropriate authority within the victim-country (e.g., U.S.
CYBERCOM) be conducted to determine recourse and the use of a counterattack.
Naturally, technical realities of cyber infrastructure, strategic public-private
dealings, and a growing number of domestic cyber legal regimes around the world
will begin to cloud what constitutes state action/responsibility versus privately239
motivated action. As commentators, such as Shackleford and Andres, observe,
there is indeed room for more flexible standards to guide countries, and as we
believe that such guidance can be instructive to any operator, including those at
private companies.240 Our framework, therefore, can provide some prediction of
how companies can tackle the challenges of operating in an uncertain cyber world
and evaluating what their recourse may be, based on attributing a source. Even as
cyber regimes and state practice will come to further define this field, certainly our
“good enough” standard for adequate attribution reflects the complications and
interests involved in making a decision to use active defense countermeasures.
B. Consequences of Incorrect Attribution
As mentioned, a victim-company that deploys active defense measures against an
incorrectly attributed target, neutral-company or neutral-country, could face
significant legal consequences.241 The counter-attacking company could be subject
to criminal or civil liability under federal and state statutes, international law, or
state common law.242
Numerous federal statutes make it unlawful to disable or gain unauthorized
access to computer systems. For example, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
(CFAA) makes it unlawful to produce a transmission causing damage to a
computer, or to access a computer without authorization to obtain information,

239. See Cyberwar: War in the Fifth Domain, ECONOMIST, July 2010, at 25, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/16478792 (noting that it remains unclear whether the cyberattacks against
Estonia and Georgia were carried out by state or non-state actors).
240. Scott Shackelford & Richard Andres, State Responsibility for Cyberattacks: Competing Standard for a
Growing Problem, 42 GEO. J. INT’L L. 972, 999–1000 (2011).
241. See supra Part IV.B.
242. See infra notes 243–59 and accompanying text.
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obtain anything of value by fraud, or cause damage.243 CFAA violations could
subject a company engaging in active defense against the wrong actor to either
criminal or civil liability.244 In addition, the Wiretap Act makes it unlawful to
intercept or attempt to intercept wire, oral, or electronic communications.245
Violators are subject to both criminal and civil liability, and information obtained
through violations is not admissible in any U.S. court proceeding.246 The Stored
Communications Act makes it unlawful to access a facility through which an
electronic communication service is provided without authorization and thereby
obtain, alter, or prevent authorized access to a communication in electronic
storage, giving rise to both criminal and civil liability.247 Each of the above could be
implicated in cases of incorrect attribution.
Responses based on mistaken attribution may also violate federal intellectual
property law. For example, the Economic Espionage Act makes it a federal crime to
knowingly steal or destroy a trade secret.248 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act
makes it unlawful to “circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls
access” to a copyrighted work.249
If active defense mistakenly targets a foreign nation, the persons responsible may
have violated the Neutrality Act.250 The Neutrality Act makes it unlawful to bring
“any military or naval expedition or enterprise” against a foreign state or
government with which the United States is at peace.251 While no court has yet
considered whether a cyberattack can constitute a military enterprise, at least
some commentators have suggested that the statute ought to be interpreted in
such a way.252
Misattributed responses could also run afoul of international law. Under the
Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime, signatory states are obligated to
adopt criminal laws making it unlawful to gain unauthorized access to a computer,
to intercept electronic transmissions without authorization, to damage or delete
computer data without authorization, to sabotage computer systems without
243. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000); see Stewart Baker, The Hackback
Debate, STEPTOE CYBER L. BLOG (Nov. 2, 2012), http://www.steptoecyberblog.com/2012/11/02/the-hackbackdebate (discussing the legality of hacking back under the CFAA with a full account of the dueling views of
Stewart Baker and Professor Orin Kerr).
244. Id.
245. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2006).
246. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (2006).
247. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701, 2707 (2006).
248. 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (2006).
249. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006).
250. 18 U.S.C. § 960 (2006).
251. Id.
252. Paul Rosenzweig, The Organization of the United States Government and Private Sector for Achieving
Cyber Deterrence, in PROCEEDINGS OF A WORKSHOP ON DETERRING CYBERATTACKS: INFORMING STRATEGIES AND
DEVELOPING OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 245, 261 (2010) (asserting that whether a cyberattack from the private
sector constitutes a military expedition is an important question).
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authorization, and to use or distribute a device or program for the purpose of
committing any of the foregoing crimes.253 Numerous countries have executed their
obligations under the Convention on Cybercrime by enacting compliant laws.254
Misattributed countermeasures could also run afoul of U.S. state law. These
include laws prohibiting unauthorized access to computers,255 transmission of
malicious code,256 and installation of spyware.257 In addition, such tactics could
violate state trade secret laws. Furthermore, victims of such countermeasures could
prevail under tort causes of action including trespass to chattels258 and conversion.259
Curtis Karnow has suggested applying the law of nuisance to cyberattacks, which
might permit companies to take some self-help measures against correctly
attributed attackers, but courts have not yet adopted this theory.260
Another important consideration, even when accurate attribution is made, is
how precise of a response is appropriate. For example, should active defense
measures be targeted at the attacker’s machine, network, enterprise, or ISP? The
precision of the response is inversely proportional to the potential for collateral
damage. As Curtis Karnow has noted, “intermediate machines, or zombies in a
DDoS attack, may be operated by hospitals, governmental units, and
telecommunications entities such as Internet service providers that provide
connectivity to millions of people.”261 An active defense tactic employed by a U.S.based accounting firm in 1997 reportedly “took down 75% of the Internet.”262 One
commentator argues that active defense measures should not be taken against
companies just because single employees have been attributed as attackers.263

253. Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, Eur. T.S. No. 185, available at http://conventions.coe.int/
Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/185.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2012).
254. See, e.g., The Computer Misuse Act, 1990, c. 18 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/1990/18/contents (last visited Nov. 1, 2012); LORENZO PICOTTI & IVAN SALVADORI, NATIONAL
LEGISLATION IMPLEMENTING THE CONVENTION ON CYBERCRIME – COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND GOOD PRACTICES
(2008), available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/t-cy/T-CY%20%282008%29%20DOC%20
National%20legislation%20implementing%20E.PDF.
255. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 502 (West 2011); N.Y. Penal Law §§ 156.00–156.50 (McKinney 2006).
256. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 502(c)(8) (West 2011).
257. See, e.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 22947–22947.6 (West 2005); 720 ILCS 5/17-52.5. (West 2012).
258. See, e.g., Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); America Online, Inc. v.
IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548 (E.D. Va. 1998) (allowing a victim of cybercrime to make a claim for trespass to
chattel).
259. See Margae, Inc. v. Clear Link Technologies, LLC, 620 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1288 (D. Utah 2009) (holding
that a the plaintiff had a cognizable claim of conversion after being locked out of its own Internet pages by
defendant).
260. Curtis E.A. Karnow, Launch on Warning: Aggressive Defense of Computer Systems, 7 YALE J.L. & TECH.
87, 98–102 (2005). Karnow has also argued that such self-help should give rise to “authorization” to take active
defense measures under CFAA. Id. at 101–02.
261. Id. at 93.
262. Winn Schwartau, Cyber-Vigilantes Hunt Down Hackers, CNN.COM (Jan. 12, 1999 12:19 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/TECH/computing/9901/12/cybervigilantes.idg/.
263. Kesan & Hayes, Thinking Through, supra note 66, at 339.
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Because of the potential for harm due to certain active defense measures, which
could provoke retaliation and in some cases international conflict, some
commentators have suggested requiring companies to seek government approval
before initiating them.264

VI. Conclusion
Neither active defense nor attribution presents novel policy or technical issues. The
security community has been discussing both for quite some time. While a dialog
has started to take shape with recent pronouncements by policymakers
acknowledging the need to apply traditional notions of self-defense in cyber
operations,265 meaningful guidance has not yet developed that would allow a
stakeholder in the commercial community to freely take action that might be
necessary to protect itself.266 In October 2012, then Secretary of Defense Leon
Panetta made the bold pronouncement that “[p]otential aggressors should be aware
that the United States has the capacity to locate them and hold them accountable
for their actions that may try to harm America.”267 Panetta, also commented that
traditional self-defense concepts would be part of the “rules of engagement” being
finalized by the Department of Defense.268 However, little has been talked about
how the private sector would be impacted, both in helping the government and in
terms of helping itself confront attackers.
A part of any such dialog necessarily must include legislative considerations and
the effect of the legal landscape on active defense. Although the recent session of
Congress was unable to pass any kind of cybersecurity legislation, the underlying
principles of some of the bills can provide some guidance as to how Congress might
approach the issue of active defense. For example, the so-called “safe harbors” that
existed in the SECURE IT Act and provided limited liability for information sharing
could be used as a model for providing limited liability in cases where an entity
269
might be under cyberattack. If the victim of such a cyberattack reasonably
believed that offensive cyber actions were necessary and such reasonable belief was
based on attribution under a framework such as the one described herein, that
victim might be afforded some kind of liability protection, particularly if the victim

264. Kesan & Hayes, Mitigative Counterstriking, supra note 28, at 519.
265. See Koh Remark, supra note 238; Leon Panetta, Secretary of Defense, Remarks by Secretary Panetta on
Cybersecurity to the Business Executives for National Security (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www.defense.gov/
transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5136.
266. See Kenneth Corbin, Cybersecurity Stalls in Senate, Obama Could Issue Executive Order, CIO MAGAZINE
(Nov. 16, 2012), http://www.cio.com/article/721824/Cybersecurity_Stalls_in_Senate_Obama_Could_Issue_
Executive_Order.
267. Panetta, supra note 265.
268. Elisabeth Bumiller & Thom Shanker, Panetta Warns of Dire Threat of Cyberattack, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12,
2012, at A1.
269. SECURE IT Act of 2012, H.R. 4263, 112th Cong., § 102(g) (2012).
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took cyber action against the wrong party. Obviously, any such liability protection
would be premised on not only adequate attribution but also appropriate attention
to any whitelisting mandates and compliance with conventional rules of
engagement (e.g., avoid any kinds of attacks that would harm any kind of critical
infrastructure or civilian facilities like hospitals, churches, or schools).
Ultimately, attribution remains a challenging policy issue in the broader context
of active defense.270 Provided that a national policy develops that explicitly permits
active defense, an adequate or “good enough” approach to attribution will allow
active defenses to be used in a meaningful way instead of remaining in a murky area
where fear and uncertainty exist. While risks exist (e.g., using an adequate
attribution approach could marginally increase the chances of the wrong party
being counterattacked), the resulting protections and clarity of policy make it
worthwhile.

270.

See supra Part IV.
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